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Abstract
Recent work suggests that crowd workers can replace experts and trained coders in com-
mon coding tasks. However, while many political science applications require coders to
both find relevant information and provide judgment, current studies focus on a limited
domain in which experts provide text for crowd workers to code. To address potential
over-generalization, we introduce a typology of data producing actors—experts, coders, and
crowds—and hypothesize factors which affect crowd-expert substitutability. We use this ty-
pology to guide a comparison of data from crowdsourced and expert surveys. Our results
provide sharp scope conditions for the substitutability of crowd workers: when coding tasks
require contextual and conceptual knowledge, crowds produce substantively different data
from coders and experts. We also find that crowd workers can cost more than experts in
the context of cross-national panels, and that one purported advantage of crowdsourcing—
replicability—is undercut by an insufficient number of crowd workers.
Political scientists often rely on experts to code data. While expertise plays an important
role in a wide range of coding tasks, an increasing number of “expert surveys” (e.g., the
British Election Study Expert Survey, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, the Electoral Integrity
Project, Quality of Government, Transparency International, and Varieties of Democracy)
prominently tout the advantages of expert coders. Experts’ purported virtues are manifold.
They allow researchers to obtain information on complex topics; gather data cross-nationally
and over time, even when observable indicators (e.g. roll call votes or election manifestos) are
not universally available; and deductively determine the content of their measures (Hooghe,
Bakker, Brigevich, de Vries, Edwards, Marks, Rovny & Steenbergen 2010). Surveys also
distribute coding efforts across the research community, providing a widely accessible public
good, and are inexpensive compared to fieldwork, archival research, and large-scale public
and elite surveys.
Crowdsourcing—the large-scale recruitment of lay persons to code data—has emerged
as a tool for data collection in traditionally expert-reliant domains (Kittur, Chi & Suh
2008, Cooper, Khatib, Treuille, Barbero, Lee, Beenen, Leaver-Fay, Baker, Popovic & Players
2010, Honaker, Berkman, Ojeda & Plutzer 2013, Benoit, Conway, Lauderdale, Laver &
Mikhaylov 2016, D’Orazio, Kenwick, Lane, Palmer & Reitter 2016). The key distinction
between these approaches is that expert surveys typically rely on extracting highly specific
and accurate knowledge about each case from a few experts, while crowdsourced methods
average across many error-prone non-experts. However, assuming a sufficiently large crowd
size and no systematic bias, crowdsourcing can theoretically provide an accurate measure
of any concept. Indeed, Benoit et al. (2016) argue that crowds can match or outperform
experts on four dimensions:
1. Reliability: Experts are potentially subject to biases (e.g. ideology, socialization,
education) that crowd workers are not.
2. Validity: A crowdsourced approach can be implemented consistently for certain ex-
ercises across contexts.
3. Cost efficiency: Internet-based crowdsourcing may be cheaper than expert surveys
due to smaller payments to individual coders.
4. Replicability: Given the cost and often unclear sampling procedure for recruiting
experts, expert-coded datasets are not easily reproducible. In principle, crowd-based
data are replicable.
In the context of coding researcher-supplied text, Benoit et al. (2016, pp. 279) “show
that properly deployed crowdsourcing generates results indistinguishable from expert ap-
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proaches.” In conjunction with these advantages, they argue that such substitutability serves
as “as a proof of concept,” with utility that “extends to all subfields of political science.”
This paper demonstrates that this claim has strict scope conditions. We first develop
a typology of actors—experts, trained coders, and crowd workers—who produce secondary
data.1 We then theorize about when crowds can substitute for traditional secondary data
generation, in particular how the task, coder characteristics, and incentives affect the ability
of crowds to produce data of similar quality to experts or trained coders. We also confront
the questions of 1) if crowdsourcing is inherently cheaper than expert coding and 2) if there
are enough crowd workers for actual replication.
Second, we combine experimental and observational evidence to examine whether crowd-
sourced data can substitute for expert-coded data in contexts beyond coding researcher-
supplied text. Specifically, we compare crowdsourced data to data from the Varieties of
Democracy (V–Dem) v7.1 data set, which provides a wide array of measures of political in-
stitutions across space and time (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman,
Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Knutsen, Lu¨hrmann, Marquardt, Mechkova, McMann, Olin,
Paxton, Pemstein, Pernes, Sanhueza Petrarca, von Ro¨mer, Saxer, Seim, Sigman, Staton,
Stepanova & Wilson 2017). Two types of coders generate this V–Dem data: 1) experts,
who use Likert scales to provide cross-national longitudinal measures of concepts which are
difficult or impossible to directly measure (e.g. the degree to which Argentina was free from
political killings in 2014); and 2) trained coders, who use a standardized set of instructions
to code directly observable (“factual”) questions (e.g. the minimum voting age in Argentina
in 2014). We examine how incentives, task complexity, and crowd coder characteristics
influence substitutability between coding approaches.
We find that crowd workers are poor substitutes for experts. The correlation between
crowd and expert codings varies from weakly positive to negative across questions; there is
also little evidence that crowd averages converge toward expert averages. We also find that
the differences between crowds and experts increase with higher pay, perhaps because it en-
courages low quality crowd workers to complete all tasks. Most task and coder characteristics
have no substantial influence on the difference between crowds and experts.
We further find little evidence that crowd workers can substitute for trained coders.
However, some crowd worker characteristics are correlated with better performance, and
crowd worker performance is sensitive to both the complexity and information availability
of factual questions. These latter findings indicate that it may be possible to design a crowd
survey that accurately gathers relatively accessible and simple forms of factual data.
1For our purposes, primary data are directly observable (e.g., public opinion survey results or roll call
votes). Secondary data are observations produced in a manner requiring human judgment.
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Overall, these findings constitute strong evidence that experts and trained coders remain
necessary for coding enterprises where the data generating process requires contextual or
conceptual knowledge. Broadly, they demonstrate that while crowd workers can provide
their opinions and accurately code expert-generated text data (Benoit et al. 2016), they
do not have the necessary training or incentives to provide judgment on more complicated
phenomena.
1 Theorizing experts, coders, and crowds
Even in the case of directly observable data, social-scientific coding tasks generally require
judgment and contextual knowledge. For example, determining the current head of gov-
ernment in Iran requires 1) knowledge of the respective roles of the President and Supreme
Leader and 2) a conceptual basis for determining which leader has greater power. The
required judgment increases for concepts that are difficult or impossible to directly observe.
The conditions necessary to generate such secondary data with high validity remains
under-theorized and under-researched. While political science applications of crowdsourc-
ing often frame crowds as an alternative to experts (Honaker et al. 2013, Benoit et al.
2016, D’Orazio et al. 2016), we argue these applications generally involve replacing “trained
coders,” not “experts.” To clarify this argument, we make a threefold distinction between
experts, trained coders, and crowds.
1.1 What is an expert?
We use Morris (1977, pp. 679) as a baseline for defining an expert: an expert is “anyone
with special knowledge about an uncertain quantity or event.” We consider this definition
to pertain to individuals who have devoted a significant portion of their lives to developing
specialized knowledge and are practiced in discovering new information, such as academics
or practitioners.
Two aspects of expertise require further discussion. First, expertise is not generic. A
political science professor who studies ethnic conflict in Azerbaijan is an expert on “ethnic
conflict” and “Azerbaijan,” but not necessarily either of these topics in other contexts (e.g.
“ethnic conflict in Kenya” or “natural resource allocation in Azerbaijan”). In the context
of data-collection enterprises, this qualification means that the identification of expertise is
question- and case-specific.
Second, expert judgments remain subject to a variety of potential biases. As a result,
scholarship has long held that gathering data from multiple experts to correct for individual
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biases is a necessary practice (Tetlock 2005, pp. 31–34). Such practice is especially important
when the task involves converting unobservable multidimensional data into a unidimensional
scale, as is common in expert-coding enterprises.
The V–Dem project provides an illustrative example of how expert-coding enterprises
operationalize this conceptualization of experts. V–Dem collects data on a variety of political
attributes by country and year (Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Krusell,
Marquardt, Mechkova, Pemstein, Pernes, Saxer, Stepanova, Tzelgov, Wang & Wilson 2017).
For expert-coded questions, the project recruits approximately five country experts (CEs)
for each country-year. To select CEs, V–Dem project managers based at the University
of Gothenburg collaborate with regional managers (established scholars broadly aware of
experts in the countries of their region) and country coordinators (scholars aware of experts
on their country) to develop a list of potential recruits for each of 11 subject areas (e.g.
media, elections, or political parties). The baseline for recruitment follows from the previous
discussion: CEs generally hold an advanced social science degree, and coordinated validation
between project managers, country coordinators, and regional managers ensures that the
recruited experts have deep knowledge of the country, the specific subject area, and relevant
concepts.
CEs receive monetary compensation for their service (US $1,248 for completing all eleven
surveys of a single country covering the period 1900-2012, and US $25 for yearly updates
of a single country/survey). The opportunity costs involved in completing a survey, which
can take multiple days or weeks, often outweigh the compensation. Thus, if V–Dem experts
agree to code, in many cases it is likely not solely for the money. Instead, their incentive
may take the form of non-material benefits such as contributing to a public good or a sense
of obligation. While this incentive structure does not necessarily lead to higher quality data,
it diverges from the more material incentives of other types of coders.
1.2 What is a coder?
A common mode for secondary data generation relies on “trained coders,” of which there are
two types. The first uses protocols to classify provided materials, making rank-order judg-
ments about democracy levels in different states (Honaker et al. 2013), applying a coding
frame to manifesto text (Benoit et al. 2016) or coding the presence or absence of militarized
interstate incidents in furnished reports (D’Orazio et al. 2016). The second conducts back-
ground research, typically using a protocol to code variables that relate to directly observable
data.
The characteristics of these trained coders generally differ substantially from those of
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experts. They often do not have an advanced degree in the subjects they are coding and do
not typically have the information necessary for task completion prior to beginning the task
(e.g., undergraduates majoring in political science who have applied for research experience
credits). Instead, they are generally pre-screened for suitability for the task and trained to
complete it. However, through the act of completing the task, these coders may develop a
level of knowledge equivalent to expertise.
1.3 What is a crowd worker?
Individuals who constitute “crowds” are not a random selection of individuals across the
world. Instead, they are individuals associated with online enterprises such as Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) or Crowdflower. Research indicates many crowd workers are
intelligent and trainable, like trained coders: Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis (2010) found no
difference between crowd workers, undergraduates, and other Internet users on a self-reported
measure of numeracy that correlates highly with actual quantitative abilities. However,
crowd workers often learn more slowly and have more difficulty with complex tasks than
university students, perhaps reflecting differences in age and education (Crump, McDonnell
& Gureckis 2013).
Unlike trained coders, crowd workers are not recruited because of their ability to acquire
knowledge or technical expertise. These workers conduct a large number of different tasks,
and are neither trained nor incentivized to master a specific one. They are almost wholly
motivated by the financial incentive for task completion, though they may find some tasks
more interesting than others.
The main advantage of crowd workers over trained coders and experts is that they are
relatively cheap and numerous. Crowd workers receive only small compensation for each task,
which means that a researcher can recruit hundreds or thousands of them for a relatively
small cost. As of 2015, there were over half a million registered users on MTurk (Peer,
Samat, Brandimarte & Acquisti 2016) providing a sufficient quantity for a range of coding
tasks.
2 When can crowds replace experts and coders in prac-
tice?
The primary aim of this paper is to further establish conditions under which crowds can
substitute for experts and trained coders in the generation of secondary data. The research
of Benoit et al. (2016) has already demonstrated that crowd workers can substitute for
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trained coders in coding data based on texts with which they are provided. As a result, we
focus here on tasks that require knowledge. We first compare the resources necessary for
implementing a crowdsourced project as a substitute, then theorize which task and coder
characteristics should facilitate substitutability.
2.1 Resources necessary to recreate an expert-coded dataset with
crowd workers
To illustrate the resources necessary to recreate an expert-coded dataset with crowdsourcing,
we use the V–Dem project as a reference. We focus only on the expert-coded portion of V–
Dem, since the analogous cost comparison for the trained-coder portion of the dataset is
sensitive to incentive expectations (e.g. salary, course credit) of potential recruits.
We focus on the initial V–Dem coding wave, in which 2,500 experts coded 177 countries,
113 years, and 151 indicators. Each observation generally had five or more coders. A
(hypothetical) expert coding the entire set of 151 indicators (spanning eleven surveys for
varying subject areas) for a given country, would receive $1,248, regardless of the number
of years they coded (1900-2012). The average number of years coded was 99, which we use
as an input to estimate the crowd costs. The average cost per observation is thus $0.08 per
country-year-indicator.
In Figure 1, we present the total cost for producing the initial V–Dem dataset under
different scenarios. The first scenario (in red) represents the cost of using expert coders. The
next three scenarios represent producing the same dataset using crowd workers and paying
them $0.12 to code each country-year-indicator observation, which is a typical payment
on MTurk. We model the costs allowing for five coders per country-year-indicator, then
20 and 30, on the assumption that crowd coder responses will converge less quickly than
expert responses. The final three scenarios represent producing the same dataset paying
crowd workers $0.24 to code each observation, which is a high payment by crowdsourcing
standards but perhaps reasonable given the difficulty of the coding task. Figure 1 illustrates
that there is little reason to believe that crowdsourced data are cheaper than expert-coder
data under these conditions.2
A related issue is that there may not be sufficient coders to reproduce cross-national
datasets, such as V–Dem v7.1, which has over 2.5 million unique observations originating
from experts’ assessments. If we optimistically assume that crowd workers are willing to
2Please note that the scenarios depicted in Figure 1 exclude overhead costs, focusing only on coder remu-
neration. It is not clear which coder population—experts or crowd workers—would require more overhead:
both projects would require staff and resources to develop and implement instruments, as well as oversee
data collection, validation, and publication.
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Figure 1: Coder Costs of Producing V–Dem Dataset with Experts and Crowds
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spend an hour on a project and a minute on each task, then each worker would complete
60 observations. Replicating the V–Dem dataset with five crowd workers per observation
would require over 220 thousand workers; with 20 crowd workers per observation 990 thou-
sand; and with 30 coders per observation over 1.3 million. As of 2015, Amazon MTurk had
approximately 500 thousand workers, which would only be sufficient for 11 coders per obser-
vation. Therefore, unless crowd workers are very statistically efficient, it would be difficult
to replicate a dataset the size of V–Dem, given the existing worker population.
2.2 Project characteristics that affect substitutability
The above discussion assumes that, in sufficient number, crowd workers can produce sec-
ondary data which substitute for their expert- and trained coder equivalents. However, such
substitutability may depend on the coding task, crowd worker characteristics, and incentives
provided to coders. We discuss each of these characteristics in turn and provide observable
implications for testing their effects.
Task attributes can be disaggregated into the sub-attributes issue complexity, task com-
plexity, information, and bias. Task complexity is determined by the specialist knowledge
implicit in the task itself, issue complexity. Tasks requiring the expert-level understanding of
concepts and that are difficult to convey in a short description exhibit high issue complexity,
which we expect to be more difficult for crowd workers. We hypothesize that the manner in
which the researcher conveys the task to the coder, question complexity, is also important.
While experts have experience parsing complex descriptions in their fields, and coders can be
trained to handle complicated tasks, we do not expect the average crowd worker to possess
such capabilities.
Information availability should also influence crowd substitutability. Experts have access
to information unavailable to the general population and can draw on years of case-specific
experience. Trained coders generally have the necessary time to seek out requisite sources of
information, though not necessarily information unavailable to the general population. We
expect that crowd workers neither have the time, nor the training, to find such information.
Similarly, we predict that measuring observable concepts (e.g. de jure institutions like voting
age) should be easier for crowd workers compared to concepts that are difficult or impossible
to directly observe (e.g. de facto political and institutional conditions, such as the degree to
which the judiciary is independent from influence by the executive).
The final task characteristic is relative potential bias across experts and crowd workers.
Polarizing issues that activate implicit biases or emotional reactions are likely to disadvantage
crowd workers relative to experts. While experts on a polarizing issue have an understanding
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of the appropriate range that has existed across polities over time, we expect the modal crowd
worker to have lower tolerance. Thus, we predict crowd workers will show explicit biases
towards extreme “all-or-nothing” responses.
Crowd worker characteristics may also affect substitutability. We focus on two dimen-
sions: background and diligence. We expect coders with a background of living or studying in
a particular country, or those who speak a country’s language, to better generate secondary
data about the country than other workers; these characteristics are generally prerequisites
for experts (though not trained coders). Similarly, those with baseline knowledge or interest
in the given domain, another requirement for experts, should outperform other workers. For
instance, people who follow politics in a broad sense may outperform those who find politics
boring. Similarly, education level allows access to knowledge and information, and higher
education should predict substitutability.
We also hypothesize that diligence will influence the accuracy of crowd workers’ codings.
While bots are the most egregious example of crowd workers who are not diligent, other
workers may rush to complete the tasks without fully considering their responses. Unless
crowd workers are penalized for inaccurate codings, they have every financial incentive to
complete a survey as quickly as possible. Experts and trained coders, however, have strong
incentives—due to a sense of obligation (experts) or material interests (trained coders)—
to accurately complete tasks, regardless of time. “Screener” tasks and other measures of
compliance allow researchers to assess the degree to which respondents are paying attention
to the task. Similarly, measures of time investment provide researchers with a sense of
whether or not coders are rushing through the survey.
Finally, because crowds are primarily pay-motivated, we hypothesize that increased pay-
ment can offset task difficulty. However, since one of the primary advantages of crowdsourc-
ing is its (supposedly) relatively low cost, there is a clear tension between decreasing average
coding error and higher payment, as Figure 1 succinctly illustrates.
Table 1 provides a reference for the categories we discuss in this section. We organize
the categories into subcategories, explain how we expect variation in these characteristics to
determine the relative ability of crowd workers to substitute for experts, and describe how
we operationalize these hypotheses.
3 Research design
We test these hypotheses by comparing V–Dem’s raw expert- and trained coder-generated
secondary data to crowd responses to a March 2017 survey. We intended this survey to
be a pilot for a larger endeavor, but the pilot data indicate that conducting the full-scale
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Table 1: Variables and hypotheses
Category Name Description Hypothesized Hypothesis Test
Effect on
Substitutability
Task (Complexity) Issue Complexity The amount of nuance and
complexity of issues considered
in the task
− Observational question trait: Av-
erage V–Dem expert coder confi-
dence (Section A.2.1)
Task (Complexity) Question Complex-
ity
The complexity of the question
language
− Observational question trait: The
length of the English language text
of the V–Dem question plus the
length of all of the choices for each
question, measured in number of
characters (Section A.2.1)
Task (Information) Information Avail-
ability
The amount of information
available to assist the partici-
pant in completing the task
+ Observational country-year trait:
Measure based on quantity of in-
formation available online and in
published texts for each country-
year (Section A.2.3)
Task (Information) Recency Whether the task pertains to
recent events or political phe-
nomena
+ Observational year trait: Six
purposively-selected five-year
spans (30 years total) between
1915 and 2015 (Section A.2.2)
Task (Information) Verifiable (vs. Per-
ception)
Tasks that have a verifiable,
correct answer (as opposed to
relying on a subjective percep-
tion of a latent trait)
+ Observational question trait: Four
purposively-selected factual V–
Dem variables of varying findabil-
ity and dimensionality (Section ??)
Task (Bias Potential) Issue Polarization Polarizing issues are those that
activate pre-conceived biases,
emotional reactions, or per-
sonal experiences
− Observational question trait:
Purposively-selected polarizing
question about political killings
(Section ??)
Coder (Background) Case Familiarity Whether the task pertains to a
case known by the participant
+ Observational coder trait: Indica-
tors representing whether a coder
is 1) coding a country of long-term
residence, and 2) fluent in an offi-
cial language of the country
Coder (Background) Baseline Knowl-
edge
Whether the coder has a base-
line level of knowledge relevant
to the task
+ Observational coder trait: Indica-
tors of whether a coder 1) discusses
politics and 2) earned a degree in
political science
Coder (Background) Education Whether the coder is educated + Observational coder trait: Indica-
tor of complete or incomplete uni-
versity education
Coder (Diligence) Compliance Whether the coder is able to
pass “compliance” tests
+ Observational coder trait: Indica-
tors of a coder’s successful com-
pletion of questions that gauge 1)
attention and 2) basic competency
(Section ??)
Coder (Diligence) Time Investment How much time is taken to
complete the task
+ Observational coder trait: How
long the coder took to complete
each task
Incentives Pay The magnitude of the per-task
payment received by the par-
ticipant
+ Experiment: Randomly-assigned
high/low payment condition
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experiment is unwarranted.3
We ran the study on the crowdsourcing platform CrowdFlower;4 workers self-selected
into the research pool, though we randomized aspects of the task and incentives.
3.1 Task characteristics
We randomly assigned each respondent two of nine V–Dem indicators, and asked the respon-
dents to code these indicators sequentially for six five-year periods for Argentina. Following
completion of the second indicator, workers optionally coded the same (second) indicator
for an additional set of six five-year periods for Senegal. We briefly discuss our rationale
for each of these choices in this section; for a more in-depth discussion of some choices, see
Appendix A.
We selected nine V–Dem indicators to ensure variation in information type, question
and issue complexity, and polarization. Five of the nine indicators are based on perception,
and CEs code them for V–Dem. The remaining four indicators pertain to verifiable, factual
data; V–Dem uses trained coders to collect these data. We expect crowd workers to perform
worse (i.e., be less substitutable for experts) on the perception-based indicators than on the
factual indicators, as coding these indicators requires high levels of contextual and conceptual
knowledge. The information and question format provided to the crowd workers corresponds
to that which V–Dem CEs and trained coders see in their coding interface, making the tasks
similar and thus facilitating comparison.5
We asked crowd workers to code a single country for two indicators to make the coding
task easier, assuming that a worker could use similar data sources for both indicators; the
rationale for asking her to code the same (second) indicator for the second country is the
same. We chose Argentina and Senegal as countries for analysis because they are not the
most internationally-prominent cases—relative to the United States, Russia or China—but
are essential cases for any coding enterprise with cross-national pretensions. While the av-
erage crowd worker can likely better code indicators regarding the United States than those
regarding Argentina or Senegal, evidence of substitutability in that case could exaggerate
the scalability of the enterprise. Analyses in Appendix A indicate that Argentina has an
intermediate level of English-language data availability in terms of Wikipedia data on poli-
3Since we designed this study as a pilot, we did not register a pre-analysis plan (PAP). However, we did
write a PAP, describing both the pilot and the full experiment, which we distributed among co-authors prior
to the pilot. Due to the more limited nature of the data in the pilot, we do not conduct every analysis in the
PAP, and instead treat it as a set of pre-specified analyses. We note key areas where our analysis diverges
from the PAP in the manuscript. See Appendix J for an anonymized version of the circulated PAP.
4For CrowdFlower details, see Peer et al. (2016) or Shapiro, Chandler & Mueller (2013).
5See Appendix B for example screenshots of the crowd worker interface.
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tics, while Senegal has a low level, providing us with some leverage to examine the effect of
information availability on substitutability: we expect the average crowd worker to better
code data for Argentina relative to Senegal (Argentina is the reference level in analyses, with
Senegal representing codings for this country).
We chose to use five year periods—not randomly-selected years or the complete period—
to reduce the workload on crowd workers, while ensuring many observations per country-
year-indicator. In selecting years, we considered two main criteria. First, in line with our
recency hypothesis, we selected both recent and past five-year periods. Second, we selected
periods that span major international political events to assess the degree to which crowd
workers static-code (i.e. do not change their codings over time). The six five-year periods,
which we denote by their final year, are: 2005, 1996, 1970, 1950 and 1920 ; we use 2011-2015
as the reference level in analyses. We expect that crowd workers will perform worse coding
years farther in the past.
3.2 Incentive characteristics
We randomly assigned workers to a typical ($0.12) or high ($0.24) payment condition, deter-
mining their level of remuneration for each coding task they performed (i.e. they received a
payment for each country-year-indicator they coded). We use the typical payment condition
as the reference level in analyses, denoting the high payment treatment with an indicator
HighPay. We expect crowd workers in the high payment condition to provide codings that
are more substitutable for expert- and trained-coder coded data.
3.3 Coder characteristics
We also analyze the relationship between crowd worker characteristics and substitutability.
To assess the effect of education on crowd performance, we use the variable No university
education, expecting that crowd workers without university education will perform worse.
We analyze baseline knowledge of political concepts with two variables: PoliSci major, which
indicates a worker who majored in political science during their undergraduate or graduate
studies; and Does not discuss politics, which identifies a worker who reports not discussing
politics.6 We expect crowd workers with a political science education, and who discuss
politics, to provide more substitutable codings for experts and trained coders.
We also analyze case familiarity using two variables at the country-indicator level. Resided
in coded country indicates a worker who reports having lived in the coded country for an
6The survey included three questions related to political awareness. We did not specify a variable pref-
erence in the PAP.
12
extended period. Reads in language of coded country represents workers who are fluent in
Spanish for Argentinian cases or French for Senegalese cases. We expect workers who have
greater familiarity with the cases to provide more substitutable codings.
To test hypotheses regarding the relationship between coder diligence and substitutabil-
ity, we analyze three variables. Two of these variables reflect basic compliance with, and
understanding of, the coding task. First, prior to coding each variable, workers were pre-
sented with one of two randomly-selected hypothetical cases (corresponding to the highest
and lowest level of the Likert scale for that variable), and asked to code the case using the
indicator Likert scale. The text for the hypothetical cases for political killings read as follows:
1. In Country X, political killings were practiced systematically and they were typically in-
cited and approved by top leaders of government. This case corresponds to the lowest
level of the Political killings scale, which reads: Not respected by public authorities. Po-
litical killings were practiced systematically and they were typically incited and approved
by top leaders of government.
2. In Country X, political killings were non-existent. This case corresponds to the lowest
level of the Political killings scale, which reads: Fully respected by public authorities.
Political killings were non-existent.
These screeners serve two purposes: they 1) familiarize crowd workers with the scale,
and 2) provide data on workers who are unable to perform the task. We use data on
crowd responses to create a variable All screeners correct, which indicates a crowd worker
who correctly coded both screener questions. Thirty-seven percent of workers coded both
screener questions correctly; 25% of workers coded neither screener correctly. We expect
workers who correctly coded both screeners to provide more substitutable data.
We also tested worker diligence with four hypothetical questions with Likert scale re-
sponses, based on V–Dem anchoring vignettes. These questions account for differential item
functioning among experts, and thus have two plausible contiguous responses (out of five
possible responses). Figure 2 presents an example of one of these questions, which we hence-
forth refer to as “Gold” questions, following Benoit et al. (2016). In the case of the example,
both “4” and “5” are “correct” responses.
To correctly code these questions requires a basic ability to read, understand concepts,
and provide judgment; they are thus more difficult than the screener questions but perhaps
more akin to traditional crowdsourced tasks, which do not require any contextual knowledge.
Accordingly, crowd workers performed worse, but not comparatively abysmally, than CEs on
these tasks: “correct” response rates by question for CEs ranges from 82 to 91%, compared
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Figure 2: Gold question example
to 57 to 63% for crowd workers.7 Responses to these questions provide additional data for
measuring individual-worker diligence, and we create the variable 3 ≤ Gold to represent
a worker who correctly coded three or more of the four Gold questions. We expect such
workers to provide data that are more substitutable for experts.8
The third diligence variable, Variable coding time, is at the country-indicator-coder level,
and represents the log-transformed time it took a crowd worker to complete a variable.
Assuming that correctly answering a question requires some degree of research, crowd workers
who spend more time coding should provide more substitutable codings.
Finally, we include three standard control variables: the continuous variable Age, a
dichotomous indicator Female, and Did not use V–Dem, which controls for whether or not
a worker reported using the V–Dem website in the process of coding.9
3.4 The sample
Our sampling strategy achieved approximately 20 observations per indicator-country-year-
treatment group. We required 10,800 observations (30 years × nine variables × two treat-
7Thirty-one percent of workers coded all four gold questions correctly, 17% three, 24% two, 14% one and
14% zero; correct response rates ranged from 57 to 63% for individual gold questions
8We did not specify the operationalization of the Gold or Screener questions in the PAP. Note that Benoit
et al. (2016) uses such questions to remove noncompliant crowd workers from the sample. Accordingly, we
also conduct analyses of the data with samples divided by the number of screener and Gold questions the
workers correctly answered (Appendix H.1).
9We did not include this variable in the PAP, but analyze it here because, in principle, coders could
have simply accessed the V–Dem website and used online tools to replicate the dataset. Indeed, a majority
of crowd workers reported using V–Dem data. Their poor performance on tasks indicates that they either
erroneously reported using the data, or used them incorrectly or sporadically.
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ment conditions × 20 observations), or 180 coders (two variables per coder); given the
likelihood of attrition, we recruited an extra 20% above the needed sample size, for a total
of 216 individuals. Given idiosyncrasies with implementation, our final sample size was 229
coders.
4 Results
We compare crowdsourced data first to expert-coded data, then trained coder-coded data.
In both contexts, we examine the relationship between task characteristics and incentives
and the substitutability of crowdsourced data, then turn to the effect of crowd coder char-
acteristics.10 Please note that these analyses concern the degree to which crowd data are
equivalent to V–Dem data. Technically, they concern only substitutability, not accuracy,
which is beyond the scope of this paper.
4.1 Expert-coded data
We selected perceptual indicators—indicators that V–Dem CEs code—that exhibit different
combinations of issue and question complexity. We assessed all five-point Likert scale ques-
tions in the V–Dem dataset using proxies for both forms of complexity, then constructed a
2× 2 table representing questions in the lower and upper quartile range on both dimensions
of complexity. To proxy question complexity, we took the combined length of a variable’s
English language text and response-category descriptions, measured in number of charac-
ters. We proxy issue complexity by evaluating the average confidence (from 1 to 100) that
V–Dem CEs self-assigned their ratings for each particular question, assuming that questions
that address more nuanced issues should be answered with lower confidence, whether or not
the question language is particularly complex. Finally, we randomly selected an indicator
from each cell. This process yielded the following indicators:
1. Forced labor : The degree to which males were free from forced labor (v2clslavem in
V–Dem codebook). High issue and question complexity.
2. Gender equality : The degree to which political power was equally distributed by gender
(v2pepwrgen). High issue complexity and low question complexity.
3. Journalist harassment : The degree to which journalists did not face harassment (v2meharjrn).
Low issue complexity and high question complexity.
10We focus on substitutability, though Appendix D presents an item non-response analysis. See Appendix
C for descriptive statistics.
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4. Judicial independence: The degree to which a high court does not make decisions based
on government positions (v2juhcind). Low issue and question complexity.
We expect crowd workers to provide the most substitutable data for Judicial indepen-
dence, the least complex question; and least for Forced labor, the most complex question;
performance on the remaining two variables should be between these two extremes (we are
agnostic as to whether or not issue or question complexity makes a question more difficult).
We also selected a fifth variable, Political killings, to represent a polarizing question on which
we expect crowd workers to provide less substitutable responses.11
Figure 3 presents an illustrative comparison of the two types of data.12 Specifically, it
plots crowd and expert scores for Political killings for Argentina 1900-2015. A score of “4”
reflects a country-year free from political killings by the government or its agents, and a “0”
a country-year in which they are endemic. Different colors represent different coders, with
lines representing smoothed coder-trends over time. The comparison is striking, and provides
immediate grounds for skepticism regarding the substitutability of crowds for experts. While
experts tend to code similar trends, it is difficult to isolate any pattern in the crowd codings.
Some crowd workers may be providing valid codings, but the noise is overwhelming.
Figure 4 provides further grounds for skepticism regarding the substitutability of crowd
scores, illustrating the linear relationship between expert-coded mean values and crowd scores
across the five expert-coded variables, using the Argentinian data. If crowd-coded data were
substitutable for expert-coded data, then the lines should be roughly on the diagonal, indicat-
ing that crowd averages correspond to expert averages. No lines come close to the diagonal,
and crowd scores for Judicial Independence even show a slightly negative relationship with
the expert mean.13
We now examine absolute differences between expert and crowd ratings, using task char-
acteristics as explanatory factors. We take as an observation the absolute difference between
the expert mean for a given country-year-variable and each crowd worker’s score for that
country-year-variable.14 Given that the expert mean is often between two ordinal categories,
11For additional information on the indicators used, see Coppedge, Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell,
Altman, Bernhard, Fish, Glynn, Hicken, Knutsen, Marquardt, Mechkova, McMann, Paxton, Pemstein,
Saxer, Staton, Seim, Sigman & Staton (2017).
12We create graphics using ggplot2 (Wickham 2009) and appendix tables using stargazer (Hlavac 2015).
13Appendix E reports results from regression analyses of the correlation between expert mean and coder
scores, which also indicates a weak relationship. We did not specify this analysis in the PAP.
14In Appendix H we provide two robustness checks of these analyses. First, to take variation in expert
scores into account, we conduct bootstrap analyses in which we draw an expert and crowd worker score for
each cell and take the absolute difference in codings. Second, we conduct analyses in which we control for
the distance of average expert scores from the middle value (2) to ensure that findings are not a function of
the placement of expert scores on the scale. Results from both analyses are congruent with those reported
in the text.
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Figure 3: Expert and crowd codings for Freedom from Political Killings in Argentina, 1916-
2015
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Figure 4: Linear relationship between average expert score and crowd worker scores for
expert-coded questions for Argentina
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precluding crowd workers from hitting the expert score exactly, a difference of <1 should be
considered “good.”
Figure 5 (corresponding to Table 26 in Appendix G.1) depicts predictions of the differ-
ence between a crowd worker’s score and the expert mean from a model that regresses this
difference on task characteristics. Each point represents the predicted average difference be-
tween mean expert and crowd worker score for a given characteristic, along with 95 percent
confidence intervals. We analyze all task characteristics, interacting all other characteris-
tics with the payment treatment to assess heterogenous treatment effects; we use codings
for the typical payment condition, of Argentina, for the period 2011-2015, and of Judicial
independence as the reference group.
At the reference level, crowd workers tend to deviate by 1.3 Likert scale points from the
mean expert coding. This value is slightly more than a quarter of the scale range, indicating
relatively low substitutability. The high payment treatment (blue lines) causes crowd cod-
ing to generally deviate further from average expert codings, an effect that is particularly
noticeable for Journalist Harassment and Political Killings (though it has the opposite effect
on Forced Labor). This suggests that higher pay encourages bad coders to stay, rather than
nurturing better coding. Most other task characteristics—recency, polarization, information
availability, and high issue/question complexity—do not seem to have much substantive in-
fluence on absolute difference. The exception is that crowd workers who code of Forced
labor tend to have greater absolute difference than workers who code other variables, which
is consistent with expectations, since it is the most complex expert-coded variable.
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Figure 5: Substantive effect of task characteristics over payment treatment effects on distance
from expert mean
Reference
HighPay
Senegal
HighPay x Senegal
Political killings
HighPay x Political killings
Forced labor
HighPay x Forced labor
Journalist harassment
HighPay x Journalist harassment
Gender equality
HighPay x Gender equality
2005
HighPay x 2005
1996
HighPay x 1996
1970
HighPay x 1970
1950
HighPay x 1950
1920
HighPay x 1920
0 1 2 3 4
Predicted absolute difference from expert mean
Reference level: 2015, Argentina, Judicial independence
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With a larger sample size, crowdsourced data might converge toward the expert mean
and be more substitutable. While we did not specify this analysis in the PAP, we conducted
analyses of bootstrapped standard errors across country-year-variable-treatment observa-
tions with different numbers of coders to assess whether varying the number of crowd workers
would increase substitutability. More precisely, for each country-year-variable-treatment we
randomly draw n coders and take their average score. We repeat this procedure 100 times
with replacement, and estimate standard deviations of the difference between average scores
and the expert mean across the 100 draws. If crowds are substitutable for experts, then
the value of this quantity should tend toward 0 as the number of sampled coders increases.
Figure 6 presents the results for the five main variables. The horizontal axis represents
the number of sampled coders, and the vertical axis the bootstrapped standard error. Red
points represent V–Dem experts, while blue and green points represent crowd workers in the
low and high payment conditions, respectively. Triangles represent data for Senegal, circles
Argentina. Experts converge relatively rapidly toward their mean: there is generally close
to no bootstrapped error after the number of sampled experts is three (out of five experts).
In contrast, there are a substantial number of observations for crowd workers in which boot-
strapped standard errors are relatively unaffected by the number of coders sampled. Even
in the case of Gender equality, where bootstrapped standard error estimates are generally
below a value of one, standard error does not appear to tend toward 0, but rather a range of
values between 0 and 1. There is therefore little evidence that greatly expanding the number
of crowd workers would yield considerably different results than our present sample size.
We now analyze how crowd worker characteristics predict substitutability. We regressed
the absolute difference between expert mean and each coder’s score on worker characteristics,
controlling for the task characteristic variables, as presented in Figure 7 (full results in
Appendix Table 9). The results do not strongly support any of our hypotheses about crowd
characteristics influencing substitutability. However, analyses with worker random effects
(Appendix F) indicate that there is substantial variation in worker substitutability. The
fact that our models cannot explain this variation is evidence that it is highly idiosyncratic,
making it difficult for researchers to purposively recruit better crowd workers.
4.2 Factual questions
We purposively selected four trained-coder questions to vary along two metrics. First, we
considered the dimensionality of the fact: whether coding requires an understanding of only
one, or several different concepts. For example, suffrage is a unidimensional concept, whereas
the requirements for referenda are complex and multidimensional (e.g., there are different
20
Figure 6: Bootstrapped standard errors across variables by number of crowd workers
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Figure 7: Substantive effect of crowd worker characteristics on distance from expert mean,
conditional on task characteristics
Reference
Does not discuss politics
No university education
PoliSci major
All screeners correct
3< Gold
Did not use V−Dem
Female
2nd quantile age
4th quantile age
Reads in language of coded country
Resided in coded country
2nd quantile variable coding time
4th quantile variable coding time
0 1 2 3 4
Predicted absolute difference from expert mean
types of referenda, different levels, and different approval stages). Second, we consider how
findable the fact was: whether crowds would know where to look to discover the fact or not.
For example, the legal provisions for suffrage are located in legal documents of the country,
whereas the suffrage level in practice is not always published in an official document. These
criteria led us to four purposively-selected variables, again corresponding to a 2× 2 table of
high vs. low levels of both findability and dimensionality:
1. Suffrage level : Percentage of population with de facto suffrage (v2elsuffrage). Less
easy to find and multidimensional.
2. Bicameral legislature: Number of chambers in legislature (v2lgbicam). Less easy to
find and unidimensional.
3. Referenda permitted : Form of referenda permitted by law (v2ddlegrf). Easy to find
and multidimensional.
4. Minimum voting age: Minimum age for voting in national elections (v2elage). Easy
to find and unidimensional.
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To measure substitutability, we use a dichotomous indicator of whether or not a crowd
coder provided the same answer as the trained V–Dem coder, using the least complex and
most findable indicator of Minimum voting age as the reference level. Figure 8 plots the
predicted probability of a substitutable answer from crowd workers based on a probit model
that includes task and incentive characteristics (see Table 27 in Appendix G.2 for complete
results). We use the same set of variables as with the expert-coded data (i.e. year for
recency, Senegal for information availability, and HighPay for incentives), substituting factual
questions for the expert-coded questions examined previously.
Focusing first on the reference treatment condition (i.e. low payment), crowd workers
are substantially more substitutable for trained coders in the reference indicator—minimum
voting age—than for other indicators. Even in this case, however, the predicted probability
that a crowd worker would produce a substitutable response is below 75 percent. Substi-
tutability with regard to the bicameralism and referenda indicators are substantially worse
(lower than 50 percent probability of substitutable answers). For suffrage, crowd workers are
less than 25 percent likely to provide substitutable data. The comparative substitutability
across coding tasks matches our expectations: voting age is both easy to find and unidimen-
sional, while suffrage level is harder to find and multidimensional; the other two questions
cross task complexity dimensions. As hypothesized, substitutability increases with recency,
though information availability (proxied by Senegal) has little influence on substitutability.
In line with the expert-coded data analyses, participants in the typical payment condition
are generally more substitutable those in the high pay condition.
Figure 9 examines the relationship between worker characteristics and the substitutability
of crowd workers for trained coders (full regression results in Table 10). We find no evidence
that coders who regularly discuss politics are more substitutable than others. Peculiarly,
coders with no university education outperformed those with education, and political sci-
ence majors under-performed on this task. Less surprisingly, coders who coded screeners
accurately (indication of diligence) substantially outperformed their peers and coders who
looked up values on the V–Dem website did better than other participants.15 Similarly,
residing in the country in question increased substitutability, as did spending more time on
the coding task.
15A subset analysis of coders who accurately coded both screeners shows substantial differences from
the analysis of the pooled data (Appendix I, Table 21). In these analyses, the high payment treatment
substantially increases the probability that coders would provide substitutable responses, indicating that
there may be an interactive effect between data quality and the incentives with which they are provided to
perform a task, conditional on baseline coder quality.
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Figure 8: Substantive effect of task characteristics on probability of correct answer to factual
questions
Reference
HighPay
Senegal
HighPay x Senegal
Referenda permitted
HighPay x Referenda permitted
Bicameral legislature
HighPay x Bicameral legislature
Suffrage level
HighPay x Suffrage level
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HighPay x 2005
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HighPay x 1996
1970
HighPay x 1970
1950
HighPay x 1950
1920
HighPay x 1920
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Predicted probability of correct answer
Reference level: 2015, Argentina, Voting age
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Figure 9: Substantive effect of coder characteristics on probability of correct answer to
factual questions, conditional on task characteristics
Reference
Does not discuss politics
No university degree
PoliSci major
All screeners correct
3< Gold
Did not use V−Dem
Female
2nd quantile age
4th quantile age
Reads in language of coded country
Resided in coded country
2nd quantile variable coding time
4th quantile variable coding time
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Predicted probability of correct answer
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5 Conclusion
Our results show that crowd workers are generally not substitutable for trained coders or
experts when data production requires conceptual and contextual knowledge. In the case
of trained coders, the degree of crowd substitutability has a low upper bound, and both
task and worker characteristics can reduce substitutability. Results for expert-coded data
are dismal: the correlation between expert-coded and crowd-coded data is minimal, and
there is little evidence that crowd-coded data would converge toward the expert mean with
an expanded sample size. Moreover, we show that reproducing expert-coded datasets with
crowd workers would likely cost more than using experts, and may in fact be wholly infeasible
given the pool of potential workers. Together, these results indicate the realm of research
endeavors to which crowdsourcing may contribute is much smaller than proponents argue.
Our typology provides an explanation for these limitations: most crowd workers have
neither the background nor the incentives to gather and analyze many types of data, while
experts and trained coders do. However, the boundaries between trained coders and crowd
workers remain somewhat unclear: our results suggest that especially diligent crowd workers
may be able to perform limited tasks which require contextual and conceptual knowledge.
Previous findings that crowd workers can substitute for trained coders in other domains align
with this claim.
We refrain here from addressing validity and replicability, both areas of purported ad-
vantage for crowd-sourced data over other forms of coded data (Benoit et al. 2016). While
we agree that producers of expert-coded datasets must address concerns regarding data va-
lidity,16 our analyses provide no indication that crowdsourced data are more valid than other
forms. Concerns regarding replicability are perhaps insurmountable given a limited pool of
experts and the costs of these enterprises. However, our analyses indicate that a replicable
crowdsourced dataset would look very different from a non-replicable expert-coded dataset.
It is to the reader to determine whether or not issues of replicability outweigh the benefits
of expertise.
16See McMann, Pemstein, Seim, Teorell & Lindberg (2016) and Teorell, Coppedge, Skaaning & Lindberg
(2016) for examples of data validation with expert-coded data.
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A Operationalization
A.1 Data collection instrument
Our instrument is a Qualtrics online survey. We base the tasks (or questions) in the instru-
ment on indicators from the V–Dem expert questionnaire, though we alter them slightly due
to the different format of this study.17
A.2 Additional details on operationalization of hypotheses about
task characteristics
A.2.1 Question and issue complexity
Question complexity: We measure question complexity across all V–Dem questions by
taking the length of the English language text of the question plus the length of all of
the descriptions of the responses categories for each question, both measured in number of
characters. We combine the lengths of question text and response text because the two
are highly negatively correlated with each other, likely because some questions load their
complexity into the question text and thus have proportionately simpler responses, and vice
versa. Accordingly, we posit that the total of the two best represents the overall textual
complexity of the questions. In addition, textual length is highly positively correlated with
the average length of time between a coder first reading a question and first entering any
rating of any kind, providing some evidence that length is related to complexity.
Issue complexity: We measure issue complexity across all V–Dem questions by evaluating
the average confidence (from 1 to 100) that coders self-assigned their ratings for each par-
ticular question. In theory, questions that address more nuanced issues should be answered
with lower confidence, whether or not the question language is particularly complex. For
example, “What is democracy?” is a very simply worded question but asks about complex
issues, and thus should be answered with lower confidence, all else equal. We have reason
to believe this measure is orthogonal to the question complexity proxy as the two measures
have a vanishlingly low correlation. In addition, the average self-reported confidence for a
question is highly correlated with the average confidence in the vignette codings for that
17Specifically, we specify that the coders are to code a specific country across specific years, and we also
change the wording to the past tense.
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same question. As these two quantities are measured independently (the coders answer vi-
gnettes separately and without indication of connection to another question elsewhere), this
suggests stability in the confidence measure, as opposed to being merely noise.
A.2.2 Recency
The V–Dem project covers most countries from 1900 to 2016. We have selected six five-year
periods ranging from distant years to more recent years. In selecting years, we considered
three criteria. First, in line with our recency hypothesis, we deliberately selected some
five-year periods that are recent and some that are farther in the past, expecting to find
lower substitutability going back in time. Second, we carefully selected times covering major
political events to assess the degree to which coders static-code (i.e., do not change their
codings over time). Finally, we deliberately chose some five-year periods prior to which the
crowd workers are likely to have been born.
• 2011-2015: The most recent time period, and thus the period with which coders are
most likely familiar.
• 2001-2005: A more distant time period in which crowds were nonetheless alive and
aware.
• 1992-1996: Third wave of democracy, still in many coders’ lifetimes.
• 1966-1970: Turbulent period prior to birth of coders.
• 1946-1950: Turbulent post-war period, far in past.
• 1916-1920: Turbulent post-war period, very far in past.
A.2.3 Information availability
We quantify information availability at the country level and year level using custom mea-
sures detailed below.
Information availability by country: Our approach in developing a measure of in-
formation availability at the country level was to evaluate the “googleability” of different
countries. To do this, we wrote software to measure the amount of data on each country
in the world available on Wikipedia, as a proxy for this general notion of easily available
information. Wikipedia has a number of standardized pages and hierarchies for organizing
pages of a similar nature. In addition, it has a number of “hidden” (in the sense that they
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aren’t linked directly from substantive pages, yet they are still open and available for public
viewing) pages that provide meta-directories of such pages, to an arbitrary depth of hierar-
chy. Our approach was to select one of these meta-directories as appropriate to the country
level unit of analysis and then recursively count and download the pages therein for each
country.
We downloaded the full text of all pages on Wikipedia, three levels deep in the organi-
zational tree for “Politics by Country.” It was important to get more than just the top level
pages because those by design are truncated at a certain length and then subdivided. For
example, the “Politics of (Country Name)” pages are almost all of about the same length,
even though there is vastly more information on certain countries. So all countries look the
same at the first level in terms of length. On the other hand, too deep of a recursion into
the hierarchy only increases skew. That is, past three levels, most countries have only a few
brief pages, and all the additional data is simply adding to the countries that already have
the highest counts. In addition, we also screen out pages Wikipedia has labeled “stubs”
(i.e., placeholder pages with at most a sentence or two of descriptive content) so as to en-
sure measurement of actual usable information. We downloaded the full contents of 187,319
Wikipedia pages, and aggregated the data into counts of the total numbers of characters
on the pages associated with every country in the world. This provides our measure of the
amount of information generally available about each country.
As MTurk users are typically native English-speakers, we also consider the official lan-
guage of the country as a proxy indicator for whether easily-accessed online material is
readable for the average crowd coder.
Finally, as another—highly V–Dem specific—operationalization of information availabil-
ity, we also consider whether the V–Dem data had been publicly released as of April 2017,
deliberately including one country in the study for which data had not yet been made avail-
able on the V–Dem website.
With this in mind, we selected four countries for our intended full experiment—United
States, Russia, Singapore, Benin—and two countries—Argentina (primary country) and
Senegal (optional) for the pilot reported here. As can be seen in Table 2, the selected coun-
tries vary in terms of their political characteristics that might affect information availability:
electoral democracy in the form of the V–Dem Polyarchy Index over time, information avail-
ability score, likely case familiarity for crowd workers (MTurk), and official languages. Ar-
gentina is in the middle range of information availability and case familiarity, while Senegal
is on the low end of the range.
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Table 2: Countries
Name Political Polyarchy Information Case English V–Dem
Name Characteristics Index (CI) Availabilty Familiarity Official Data
for Turk-
ers
Language? Released?
United
States
One of the most stable
advanced democracies,
democratic since 1776
0.86 (0.81; 0.89) 10,889 (859 mil-
lion)
High Yes Yes
Russia Revolution, disinte-
gration of the Soviet
Union
0.06 (0.02; 0.08) 2,019 (138 million) Intermediate No Yes
Singapore Authoritarian but low
corruption, repression,
conflict
N/A 638 (53 million) Intermediate Yes No
Benin Recent colonial past;
country changed names
0.46 (0.35; 0.56) 472 (27 million) Low No Yes
Argentina History of both dicta-
torship and democracy
0.81 (0.76; 0.86) 1,143 (71 million) Intermediate No Yes
Senegal Relatively stable and
consolidated democ-
racy
0.74 (0.69; 0.79) 548 (39 million) Low No Yes
B Qualtrix screenshots
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Figure 10: Screener coding example for expert-coded indicators
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Figure 11: Coding example for expert-coded indicators
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Figure 12: Screener coding example for coder-coded indicators
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Figure 13: Coding example for coder-coded indicators
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C Descriptive Statistics
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Population Mean (SD)
Age 33 years (9.4)
Female 30.0%
Spent Time in Argentina 13.7%
Spent Time in Senegal 5.8%
Coursework on Argentina 13.6%
Coursework on Senegal 10.1%
Speaks Spanish 32.1%
Speaks French 20.8%
Lives in India 14.2%
Lives in Spain 9.7%
Lives in Venezuela 8.0%
University Degree 59.9%
Political Science Major 49.4%
Political Science Courses (Non-Major) 32.2%
Discusses Politics with Friends and Family 73.1%
Interested in Public Affairs 77.5%
Follows Politics 78.3%
Voted in the Last Election 90.1%
Believes Democratic Government is Important 93.4%
Used V–Dem Data in Completing Survey 51.0%
Randomly Assigned: High Pay Condition 52%
D Analysis of item non-response
In this analysis, we consider item non-response (a missing value by a crowd worker at the
country-year-indicator level) as the outcome variable. We regress item non-response on
the task complexity variables and coder characteristics considered in the main text analyses,
pooling perceptions and factual questions in the same regression (since the item non-response
outcome variable is the same for both).
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E Correlation regression analyses
Table 25 presents regression results in which we examine the relationship between crowd and
expert data more concretely, using a standard OLS regression of each crowd coder’s rating
on 1) the expert mean and 2) task characteristics that could condition substitutability. First,
note that all models have very low R2 values, indicating that neither the expert mean nor
task characteristics explain a great deal of the variation in crowd codings. For example,
Model 1 presents results from a model in which crowd scores are regressed on the expert
mean for each country-year-variable. While the correlation between the expert mean and
crowd scores is positive and significant, indicating the expected positive correlation, the R2
is .03, indicating that the expert mean explains little variation in coder scores. Model 2
includes a variety of controls that may influence expert scores. After controlling for these
variables, the relationship between the expert mean and crowd scores decreases: perhaps
most interestingly, all the recency variables have a negative correlation with coder scores,
which indicates coders tended to code earlier years as having lower values. Since lower
scores reflect normatively worse values, it is possible that this pattern reflects crowd workers
as generally coding earlier years as being “worse” for each variable.
Model 3 interacts the expert mean with the experimental payment condition, which shows
little interactive relationship with coder scores. This finding demonstrates that crowd work-
ers with higher payment did not tend to have a higher correlation with expert mean, which
indicates that the treatment did not greatly incentivize them to provide more substitutable
data.
Model 4 presents results from a model in which we interact the expert mean with question
variables. The results indicate that the relationship between expert codings and crowd-
provided values is not consistent: while the expert mean for reference variable (v2juhcind)
has a negative relationship with the crowd codings, the expert mean for other variables
appears to have a weakly positive relationship with crowd scores. Equally importantly,
Model 3 illustrates that being randomly assigned to the high (double) pay condition does not
interact with the average expert score to significantly predict the crowd member’s rating. In
other words, higher pay does not improve the correlation between crowd and expert ratings.
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F Random effects for expert-coded variables
Figure 14 presents coder random effects models, without variable or treatment fixed effects
(panel a) and with interacted variable and treatment fixed effects (panel b). These models
indicate high variation in absolute differences across coders. Finally, Figure 7 reports the
effect of coder characteristics on the difference between expert and crowd ratings. None of
the covariates significantly shrink or grow the difference between expert and crowd ratings.
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Figure 14: Coder random intercepts from mixed models
−1 0 1 2
(a) Model without variable or treatment fixed effects
−1 0 1 2
(b) Model with interacted variable and treatment fixed effects
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G Regression tables
G.1 Expert-coded question regression tables
45
T
ab
le
7:
D
is
ta
n
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
co
d
er
sc
or
es
an
d
av
er
ag
e
ex
p
er
t
sc
or
e
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
R
ef
er
en
ce
1.
30
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1)
1.
30
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
1)
1.
19
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3)
1.
18
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3)
1.
20
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
4)
H
ig
h
p
ay
m
en
t
−0
.0
01
(0
.0
2)
0.
01
(0
.0
2)
−0
.0
3
(0
.0
5)
19
20
0.
06
∗∗
(0
.0
3)
0.
06
∗∗
(0
.0
3)
0.
12
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
4)
19
50
0.
01
(0
.0
3)
0.
01
(0
.0
3)
0.
02
(0
.0
4)
19
70
−0
.1
3∗
∗∗
(0
.0
3)
−0
.1
3∗
∗∗
(0
.0
3)
−0
.1
0∗
∗
(0
.0
4)
19
96
−0
.0
8∗
∗∗
(0
.0
3)
−0
.0
8∗
∗∗
(0
.0
3)
−0
.1
7∗
∗∗
(0
.0
4)
20
05
−0
.0
2
(0
.0
3)
−0
.0
2
(0
.0
3)
−0
.0
4
(0
.0
4)
S
en
eg
al
0.
02
(0
.0
2)
0.
02
(0
.0
2)
0.
07
∗∗
(0
.0
3)
P
ol
it
ic
al
k
il
li
n
gs
0.
20
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3)
0.
20
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3)
0.
07
∗
(0
.0
4)
F
or
ce
d
la
b
or
0.
41
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3)
0.
41
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3)
0.
52
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
4)
J
ou
rn
al
is
t
h
ar
as
sm
en
t
0.
12
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3)
0.
12
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
3)
−0
.0
3
(0
.0
4)
G
en
d
er
eq
u
al
it
y
−0
.0
3
(0
.0
3)
−0
.0
4
(0
.0
3)
0.
02
(0
.0
4)
H
ig
h
p
ay
m
en
t
×
19
20
−0
.1
1∗
(0
.0
6)
H
ig
h
p
ay
m
en
t
×
19
50
−0
.0
1
(0
.0
6)
H
ig
h
p
ay
m
en
t
×
19
70
−0
.0
5
(0
.0
6)
H
ig
h
p
ay
m
en
t
×
19
96
0.
17
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
6)
H
ig
h
p
ay
m
en
t
×
20
05
0.
04
(0
.0
6)
H
ig
h
p
ay
m
en
t
×
S
en
eg
al
−0
.0
7∗
∗
(0
.0
4)
H
ig
h
p
ay
m
en
t
×
P
ol
it
ic
al
k
il
li
n
gs
0.
23
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
5)
H
ig
h
p
ay
m
en
t
×
F
or
ce
d
la
b
or
−0
.2
3∗
∗∗
(0
.0
6)
H
ig
h
p
ay
m
en
t
×
J
ou
rn
al
is
t
h
ar
as
sm
en
t
0.
31
∗∗
∗
(0
.0
5)
H
ig
h
p
ay
m
en
t
×
G
en
d
er
eq
u
al
it
y
−0
.0
6
(0
.0
5)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
10
,4
03
10
,4
03
10
,4
03
10
,4
03
10
,4
03
R
2
0.
00
0.
00
00
0.
03
0.
03
0.
05
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0.
00
−0
.0
00
1
0.
03
0.
03
0.
05
N
ot
e:
∗ p
<
0.
1;
∗∗
p
<
0.
05
;
∗∗
∗ p
<
0.
01
R
ef
er
en
ce
:
20
15
,
A
rg
en
ti
n
a,
J
u
d
ic
ia
l
in
d
ep
en
d
en
ce
46
Table 8: Coder demographics and distance from expert mean
Reference 1.19∗∗∗ (0.04) 1.20∗∗∗ (0.04)
Does not discuss politics 0.09∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.02)
No university education 0.09∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.03)
Political science major −0.04∗ (0.02) −0.04∗ (0.02)
All screeners correct −0.09∗∗∗ (0.02) −0.09∗∗∗ (0.02)
2 < gold correct 0.04∗ (0.02) 0.04∗ (0.02)
Did not use V–Dem 0.09∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.02)
Female 0.05∗∗ (0.02) 0.05∗∗ (0.02)
log(Age) 0.05 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04)
Reads coded-country language −0.07∗∗∗ (0.02) −0.08∗∗∗ (0.02)
Resided in country coded −0.08∗∗∗ (0.03) −0.08∗∗∗ (0.03)
log(Variable coding time) −0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) −0.04∗∗∗ (0.01)
High payment −0.01 (0.02)
1920 0.08∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.08∗∗∗ (0.03)
1950 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03)
1970 −0.15∗∗∗ (0.03) −0.15∗∗∗ (0.03)
1996 −0.10∗∗∗ (0.03) −0.10∗∗∗ (0.03)
2005 −0.03 (0.03) −0.03 (0.03)
Senegal −0.003 (0.02) −0.003 (0.02)
Political killings 0.14∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.14∗∗∗ (0.03)
Forced labor 0.33∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.33∗∗∗ (0.03)
Journalist harassment 0.09∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.03)
Gender equality −0.06∗∗ (0.03) −0.06∗∗ (0.03)
Observations 8,799 8,799
R2 0.05 0.05
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.04
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Reference: 2015, Argentina, Judicial independence
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G.2 Trained coder questions regression tables
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Table 10: Coder characteristics and correct answer to factual questions
(1) (2)
Reference 0.12∗ (0.07) 0.11 (0.07)
Does not discuss politics −0.05 (0.04) −0.05 (0.04)
No university education 0.08 (0.05) 0.08 (0.05)
Political science major −0.26∗∗∗ (0.04) −0.26∗∗∗ (0.04)
All screeners correct 0.51∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.51∗∗∗ (0.04)
2 < gold correct −0.05 (0.04) −0.05 (0.04)
Did not use V–Dem −0.24∗∗∗ (0.04) −0.24∗∗∗ (0.04)
Female −0.07∗ (0.04) −0.07∗ (0.04)
log(Age) 0.30∗∗∗ (0.07) 0.30∗∗∗ (0.07)
Reads coded-country language −0.03 (0.04) −0.03 (0.04)
Resided in coded country 0.20∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.20∗∗∗ (0.05)
log(Variable coding time) 0.20∗∗∗ (0.02) 0.20∗∗∗ (0.02)
High payment 0.02 (0.03)
1920 −0.11∗∗ (0.06) −0.11∗∗ (0.06)
1950 −0.12∗∗ (0.06) −0.12∗∗ (0.06)
1970 −0.02 (0.06) −0.02 (0.06)
1996 0.01 (0.06) 0.01 (0.06)
2005 0.13∗∗ (0.06) 0.13∗∗ (0.06)
Senegal 0.06 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04)
Referenda permitted −0.20∗∗∗ (0.05) −0.20∗∗∗ (0.05)
Bicameral legislature −0.29∗∗∗ (0.05) −0.30∗∗∗ (0.05)
Suffrage level −1.06∗∗∗ (0.05) −1.06∗∗∗ (0.05)
Observations 6,842 6,842
Log Likelihood −4,072.61 −4,072.48
Akaike Inf. Crit. 8,187.22 8,188.96
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Reference: Voting age, 2015, Argentina
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H Additional Likert-scale robustness checks
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I Subset analyses
I.1 Subset by screener questions
I.1.1 No screeners correct
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Pre-analysis plan:
Experts vs. crowds pilot study
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Abstract
Scholars increasingly use expert-coded data in their statistical analyses of political phenom-
ena. Benoit, Conway, Lauderdale, Laver & Mikhaylov (2016) argue that crowd-sourced data can
substitute for expert-coded data. However, Benoit et al. base their claims on a very specific type
of data - coding issue positions of party manifestos. This project examines the circumstances
under which crowd-sourced data can substitute for expert-coded data. Specifically, it asks how
characteristics of the task, coder, and incentives provided can condition the ability of crowds to
produce data of similar quality to expert coders.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Core research question
Under what circumstances can crowd-sourced data substitute for expert-coded data? Specifically,
how can characteristics of the task, coder, and incentives affect the ability of crowds to produce
data of similar quality to that produced by expert coders?1
1.2 Motivation
Political science research increasingly uses expert indicators. Examples of large-scale expert-coding
enterprises include the British Election Study Expert Survey, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, the
Electoral Integrity Project, Quality of Government, Transparency International and Varieties of
Democracy (V–Dem). The virtues of expert surveys are manifold. In particular: “. . . they do not
require that specific sources of information (e.g., roll call votes, opinion surveys of elite position,
election manifestos or elite surveys) be accessible in all cases, and they are relatively inexpensive to
administer. In addition, expert surveys allow the researcher to use a single format to ask a common
set of questions. Whereas roll call votes, surveys and manifesto tabulations provide data that the
researcher interprets after simplifying the data (e.g., using factor analysis or scaling techniques),
expert surveys allow the researcher to design dimensions deductively” (Hooghe, Bakker, Brigevich,
de Vries, Edwards, Marks, Rovny & Steenbergen 2010).
However, scholars have criticized expert surveys with regard to a) data and measurement and
b) the data generation process. Benoit et al. (2016) compare crowd-sourced to expert coder-sourced
data of party manifestos and show that crowd-sourced estimates of party policy positions can be
used as substitutes for the trained coder estimates in this context. More generally, Benoit et al.
(2016) argue that crowds can match or outperform experts on four dimensions:
1. Reliability: Expert surveys present challenges related to the subjectivity inherent in how
experts interpret questions, which results from inter-personal differences in the properties that
experts attribute to specific concepts. Scholars question the overall consistency of expert-
coded measurements, since experts are subject to several biases (e.g., ideology, socialization,
education).
2. Validity: Given the limitations of expert-coded data, scholars have questioned their validity.
Benoit et al. (2016) find that a crowd-sourced approach is potentially more valid in certain
contexts (e.g., coding text), as it can be implemented consistently for certain exercises across
contexts.
3. Cost efficiency: The costs of running expert surveys are large, in particular in comparison
to quick and low-cost methods like internet-based crowd-sourcing, which distributes small
tasks to a large number of online workers in exchange for a small financial reward.
4. Replicability: Given the cost and often unclear sampling procedure for experts, expert-based
datasets are generally not reproducible. They therefore do not satisfy common transparency
and reproducibility standards for data generation.
In this study, we evaluate these arguments in a new context, comparing expert-coded data on
key political indicators from the V–Dem data set to crowd-sourced data covering the same topics.
1In this project, we are agnostic about what constitutes high-quality data. We focus on identifying significant
differences across expert-coded and crowd-sourced data.
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Our study is thus a direct extension of Benoit et al. (2016) and others who explicitly or implicitly
suggest that crowd-sourced data substitute for all forms of expert-coded data, including those which
rely on substantial expertise in a field or case. Combining observational data with an experimental
setup, we examine the scope conditions that determine when crowd-sourced data can substitute for
expert-coded data. We ask how characteristics of the task, coder, and incentives provided affect
the ability of crowds to produce data of similar quality to expert coders.
1.3 Definitions
1.3.1 What is an expert?
Benoit et al. (2016) and others explicitly or implicitly suggest that crowd-sourced data can be used
as a substitute for expert-coded data. While acknowledging that this may be true for some types
of tasks, we assert that there is a spectrum of tasks involved in coding enterprises, ranging from
those that crowds can certainly complete to those which experts unambiguously must complete.
As a deliberately trivial example, crowds could almost certainly compile a dataset of presidents’
birthdates: the question is straightforward, the construct of “birth date” is fixed and known across
different demographics, and the data are readily available. In contrast, crowds would be less able to
code the degree to which social identities are relevant for political participation in a given country-
year, since coding these data requires both knowledge of concepts (i.e., the definition of “social
identities” as well as “political participation”) and cases (i.e., relevant contextual information in
the country and year that affected identity and politics), as well as several cognitive steps (i.e., a
process to determine which identities are “relevant” to political participation).
As we think about this spectrum of tasks with its two extremes, we believe that there is a point
at which crowds can no longer substitute for experts because either: 1) the task is too complex; or
2) it relies too heavily on information (either conceptual or case-related) that crowds do not have
and cannot or will not obtain. In the following section we develop a theory of how these factors
collectively determine that point on the spectrum.
Before we continue, it is necessary to clarify what constitutes an “expert.” While there is no
consensus in the literature, we argue that the following characteristics provide a baseline for a
definition:
• An expert is “anyone with special knowledge about an uncertain quantity or event” (Morris
1977, pp. 679). By definition, they must invest a great deal of resources over a long time
period to acquire their knowledge.
• With regard to politics and economics, an expert is “a professional who makes his or her
livelihood by commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends of significance
to the well-being of particular states, regional clusters of states, or the international systems
a whole” (Tetlock 2005, pp. 239).
• Given that they hold a great deal of baseline knowledge regarding their tasks, and that they
are practiced in discovering new information within their area of expertise, the quality of the
information experts provide is most often solely dependent on their investment in the task.
• In the particular context of the V-Dem project, the country experts (CEs) who code tasks
fulfill all of the above criteria. To select CEs, V-Dem project managers based at the Univer-
sity of Gothenburg collaborate with regional managers (established scholars who are broadly
aware of experts in the countries in their region) and country coordinators (scholars aware
of experts in their country) to develop a list of potential recruits. CEs are typically scholars
5
or professionals with deep knowledge of a country and of a particular area of politics in that
country. V-Dem CEs generally hold a PhD, or in some developing nations an MA, a strong
signal of investment in a topic. They also have specialized knowledge in at least one country
and one of the conceptual sections of the V-Dem survey (e.g., civil society, party politics).
A majority of experts are generally citizens or residents of the country being coded, mean-
ing that they have first-hand experience in their country of interest. CEs receive monetary
compensation for their service (US $25/survey).
1.3.2 What is a coder?
Many of the articles written about “experts” are not always discussing “experts” as we conceive of
them above. They actually discuss a third, middle category of individuals that produce data. In
this study, we refer to such individuals as “coders.” We conceive of coders as follows:
• Coders often do not have an advanced degree in the subjects they are coding, and they do
not typically have the information they need before they collect it to complete the coding
task. Perhaps after they complete the coding task they could be considered an “expert” in
the area, but not before. In other words, they engage in task-specific expertise acquisition.
• Coders are often well-educated, intelligent, and competent. Some coders are able to appro-
priately complete a coding task in the face of situations that might not have been anticipated
ex ante, unlike a coder who follows a pre-specified coding protocol. But many coders are
simply trained to apply a well-specified protocol to data (e.g., classifying Manifesto sentence
fragments).
• As with experts, coders’ success in completing a given task depends largely on how invested
they are in the task.
• Coders often receive monetary compensation from the data project that employs them.
• A data-gathering enterprise employs coders to code information and includes it in the dataset.
Many projects (e.g., Polity, the Comparative Manifesto Project) make use of such coders. In
fact, V-Dem uses such “coders” to code “A” variables, or variables that relate to factual data
and do not require deep expertise to understand, research, or apply a concept.
1.3.3 What is a crowd worker?
A final important definition regards those individuals whom scholars such as Benoit et al. (2016)
consider members of “crowds.” Such individuals are not a random selection of individuals across
the world; they are individuals associated with an online survey system such as Amazon Mechanical
Turk. There has been significant research on this group of individuals and we draw on this research
to make several points:
• Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is an online labor market created by Amazon, and has become
a popular tool among social scientists as a pool for survey and experimental data. As of
2014, the MTurk workforce is composed of more than 500,000 individuals from 190 countries.
CrowdFlower provides a similar online market as well as other services, from its base in San
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Fransisco, United States. We will use CrowdFlower to run a pilot, and MTurk for the main
study.2
• Surveys consistently show that the MTurk workforce is dominated by workers residing in the
United States and India, with less than a quarter of workers residing elsewhere (Paolacci,
Chandler & Ipeirotis 2010, Ross, Irani, Silberman, Zaldivar & Tomlinson 2010).
• MTurk workers are diverse, but not necessarily representative of the populations they are
drawn from, reflecting the fact that Internet users differ systematically from non-Internet
users.
• Workers tend to be younger (about 30 years old), overeducated, underemployed, less reli-
gious, and more liberal than the general population (Berinsky, Huber & Lenz 2012, Paolacci,
Chandler & Ipeirotis 2010, Shapiro, Chandler & Mueller 2013).
• Within the United States, Asians are overrepresented and Blacks and Hispanics are under-
represented, relative to the population as a whole (Berinsky, Huber & Lenz 2012).
• Less is known about workers’ cognitive abilities, and this remains a fruitful area of investiga-
tion. Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis (2010) found no difference between workers, undergrad-
uates, and other Internet users on a self-report measure of numeracy that correlates highly
with actual quantitative abilities. However, workers may learn more slowly and have more
difficulty with complex tasks than university students, perhaps reflecting differences in age
and education (Crump, McDonnell & Gureckis 2013).
• Their success in completing a given task depends largely on how invested they are in the task.
• Crowd workers receive a small monetary compensation for completing tasks online.
• While huge in principle, the pool of crowd workers available for coding tasks is limited in
practice. While there are approximately half a million registered users on MTurk, there are
only 10,000-20,000 on each of the primary alternative platforms (Peer et al. 2016).
2 Hypotheses
The overarching research question of this project is: Under which conditions and in which domains
can crowd-sourced workers substitute for expert-coded data? In considering what might condition
the degree of substitutability of crowd-sourced data for expert-coded data, we consider character-
istics of the task, coder, and incentives. A delineation of the variables we consider, with related our
hypotheses and tests, appears in Table 1.
3 Research design
3.1 Research participants
We will use the crowd-sourcing platform Amazon Mechanical Turk to recruit crowd coders.3 Coders
will self-select into the sample. We will determine the degree to which these coders differ from the
2The participants in MTurk and CrowdFlower tend to be distinct and the response rate at CrowdFlower tends to
be faster. However, the users on CrowdFlower tend to be less attentive and less familiar with coding tasks than those
on MTurk. Therefore, using CrowdFlower for the pilot allows us to focus on the most attentive respondent pool of
crowd workers in the full study (Peer, Samat, Brandimarte & Acquisti 2016).
3After running a pilot on CrowdFlower.
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Table 1: Variables and hypotheses
Category Name Description Hypothesized Hypothesis Test
Effect on
Substitutability
Task Question Complex-
ity
The complexity of the question
language
− Observational question trait: The
length of the English language text
of the V-Dem question plus the
length of all of the choices for each
question, both measured in num-
ber of characters (Section 3.5.1)
Task Issue Complexity The amount of nuance and
complexity of issues considered
in the task
− Observational question trait: Av-
erage V-Dem expert coder confi-
dence (Section 3.5.1)
Task Issue Polarization Polarizing issues are those that
activate pre-conceived biases,
emotional reactions, or per-
sonal experiences
− Observational question trait: We
purposively select a polarizing
question about political killings
(Section 3.5.2)
Task Verifiable (vs. Per-
ception)
Tasks that have a verifiable,
correct answer (as opposed to
relying on a subjective percep-
tion of a latent trait)
+ Observational question trait: We
purposively select four fact-based
V-Dem “A” variables of varying
obscurity and dimensionality (Sec-
tion 3.5.3)
Task Recency Whether the task pertains to
recent events or political phe-
nomena
+ Observational year trait: We pur-
posively select six five-year spans
(30 years total) between 1915 and
2015 (Section 3.5.4)
Task Information Avail-
ability
The amount of information
available to assist the partici-
pant in completing the task
+ Observational country-year trait:
We create a measure based on the
information available online and in
published texts for each country-
year (Section 3.5.5)
Task Paired (vs. Likert) Participants either rank paired
cases or to place a single case
on a Likert scale
+ Experiment: We randomly assign
participants to complete paired or
Likert tasks (Section 3.5.6)
Coder Training Whether the participant re-
ceives training in preparation
for completing the task
+ Observational coder trait: We
record whether the coder opens a
training glossary we have available
to all coders
Coder Case Familiarity Whether the task pertains to a
case known by the participant
+ Observational coder trait: We
record whether the coder coded a
country of past or present long-
term residence, and whether the
coder is fluent in the official lan-
guage(s) of the country
Coder Baseline Knowl-
edge
Whether the coder has a base-
line level of knowledge relevant
to the task
+ Observational coder trait: We
record whether the coder follows
politics, discusses politics, is in-
terested in public affairs, and/or
earned an advanced degree in po-
litical science
Coder Education Whether the coder is educated + Observational coder trait: We
record the education level of the
coder
Coder Compliance Whether the coder is able to
pass “compliance” tests
+ Observational coder trait: We
track the coder’s ability to answer
questions that gauge attention and
basic competency (Section 3.6.5)
Coder Time Investment How much time is taken to
complete the task
+ Observational coder trait: We
record how long the coder took to
complete each task
Incentives Pay The magnitude of the per-task
payment received by the par-
ticipant
+ Experiment: We randomly assign
participants to a high/low pay-
ment condition
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universe of MTurk coders (if at all) using demographic information provided either by MTurk
or demographic questions on the pre- and post-survey questionnaires and then compared to past
research documenting the characteristics of the MTurk user pool (see, for example, Peer et al.
(2016) or Shapiro, Chandler & Mueller (2013)).
3.2 Sample size
In order to run the crowd-sourced data through the V–Dem measurement model (see Section 4),
we aim to have approximately 40 observations per indicator-country-year-treatment group. We are
collecting crowd-sourced data on 30 years (six 5-year blocks), four countries, nine V-Dem indicators,
and four experimental treatment combinations. As a result, we require 172,800 observations (30×
4× 9× 4× 40). If each coder in the full experiment completes 60 tasks, 3,000 coders will result in
180,000 observations.
In the pilot, we will primarily collect data on one country (and respondents who complete
their answers are asked to volunteer to code one question for an additional country to gauge their
willingness to do more than one country), and we will only run the experiment on pay, meaning there
will only be two experimental treatment combinations. This implies we require 21,600 observations
(30× 1× 9× 2× 40), or 360 coders.
Given the high likelihood of attrition, we plan to recruit an extra 10% above the needed sample
size in both the pilot and full study, for a total of 400 coders in the pilot and 3,300 coders in the
full study.
3.3 Statistical power
Separate from the requirements of the measurement model, discussed in Section 3.2, we consider the
sample size necessary to identify a statistically significant and substantively significant difference
in the mean score crowds assign to a country-year-indicator compared to expert coders. While
what constitutes a substantively significant effect size is not set, we assert that a difference in
means larger than one-tenth of a standard deviation—based on expert coder responses—would be
a substantively significant difference between crowds and experts. In Figure 1 and Table 2, we
depict the relationship between the anticipated effect size and the number of crowd coders we need
to complete a given country-year-question coding task to achieve statistical significance. Here, the
effect size has been standardized to be in units of average expert case-level standard deviations, and
we are assuming α = 0.05 and power = .80. For example, we can see that a sample of 785 crowd
coders would ensure that differences across experts and crowds greater than one-tenth a standard
deviation would result in the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 95% confidence level 80% of
the time. As our 2x2 factorial design has four experimental treatment groups, we need a sample
of 3140 individuals (784 × 4). Even though each individual is expected to do 20 coding tasks, we
conservatively estimate sample size without dividing by 20, in case there are unprecedented levels
of attrition or there are strong learning or fatigue trends across the tasks.
3.4 Data collection instrument
Our instrument is a Qualtrics online survey. We base the tasks (or questions) in the instrument on
indicators from the V–Dem expert questionnaire, though we alter them slightly due to the different
format of this study.4
4Specifically, we specify that the coders are to code a specific country across specific years, and we also change
the wording to the past tense.
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Figure 1: Relationship between effect size and sample size
Table 2: Relationship between effect size and sample size
Effect Size Sample Size
(Standard Deviations)
0.05 3140
0.10 785
0.20 197
0.30 88
0.40 50
0.50 32
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In both the pilot and the full study, out of a set of nine selected V-Dem indicators (see sections
3.5.1, 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 for explanation on selection), two indicators will be randomly selected for
each crowd coder. In the full study, out of set of four countries (see Section 3.5.5 for explanation
on selection), one country will be randomly selected for each crowd coder.5 We chose to assign
each coder to one country (as opposed to randomly selecting multiple countries) to ease the coding
task and more closely replicate the expert-survey design. The coder will code these two variables
for this one country for 30 years (see Section 3.5.4 for explanation on selection). To allow for some
bridging (as exists in the expert-coded V-Dem data), we will give coders the option to code an
additional country, for the second randomly selected indicator that they coded. If the coder takes
this option, then we will obtain 90 country-year-indicator observations per coder. If not, we will
obtain 60 country-year-indicator observations per coder.
3.5 Operationalizing hypotheses about task characteristics
3.5.1 Question and issue complexity
Four V-Dem indicators have been selected based on measurements of question and issue complexity.
We developed measures for question and issue complexity (detailed below) and identified V-Dem
indicators that fall into the lowest or highest quartile for each measure. We created a two-by-
two table mapping indicators with low issue complexity and high question complexity, indicators
with high issue complexity and low question complexity, indicators with high issue complexity and
high question complexity, and indicators with low issue complexity and low question complexity.
We removed indicators with low coverage across years from this table, and randomly selected an
indicator from each cell in the table. The randomly selected indicators are as follows.6
• Freedom from forced labor for men: High issue and question complexity.
• Harassment of journalists: Low issue complexity and high question complexity.
• Power distributed by gender: High issue complexity and low question complexity.
• High court independence: Low issue and question complexity.
Question complexity: We measure question complexity across all V-Dem questions by taking
the length of the English language text of the question plus the length of all of the descriptions of
the responses categories for each question, both measured in number of characters. We combine
the lengths of question text and response text because the two are highly negatively correlated with
each other, likely because some questions load their complexity into the question text and thus have
proportionately simpler responses, and vice versa. Accordingly, we posit that the total of the two
best represents the overall textual complexity of the questions. In addition, textual length is highly
positively correlated with the average length of time between a coder first reading a question and
first entering any rating of any kind, providing some evidence that length is related to complexity.
Issue complexity: We measure issue complexity across all V-Dem questions by evaluating the av-
erage confidence (from 1 to 100) that coders self-assigned their ratings for each particular question.
In theory, questions that address more nuanced issues should be answered with lower confidence,
whether or not the question language is particularly complex. For example, “What is democracy?”
5In the pilot, all coders are assigned to one and the same country.
6See Appendix F for the full text of each question.
11
is a very simply worded question but asks about complex issues, and thus should be answered
with lower confidence, all else equal. We have reason to believe this measure is orthogonal to the
question complexity proxy as the two measures have essentially zero correlation. In addition, the
average self-reported confidence for a question is highly correlated with the average confidence in
the vignette codings for that same question. As these two quantities are measured independently
(the coders answer vignettes separately and without indication of connection to another question
elsewhere), this suggests stability in the confidence measure, as opposed to being merely noise.
3.5.2 Issue polarization
Some issues may evoke an emotional, biased, or simply highly volatile reaction when posed to
coders. As stated above in Table 1, it may be more challenging for non-experts to set this kind of
visceral reaction aside. To test this expectation, we consider this V-Dem indicator:
• Freedom from political killings: Purposively selected because we expect it to be highly
polarizing, in that it is likely to activate pre-conceived biases, emotional reactions, or personal
experiences.
The Likert scale response categories for this indicator include options where there is a moderate
level of politically-motivated murder in the country for that year.7 While the V-Dem coders are able
to evaluate the level of political killings in a country and select these mid-level answer categories
where appropriate, we anticipate that crowd coders will be less able to implicitly tolerate any level
of political killing, and will be more likely to select the answer categories at the extremes of the
spectrum, implicitly judging that either there are no political killings or there are far too many.
We will use this indicator to test our expectation that crowd-sourced estimates of polarizing topics
such as political killings have greater variance.
3.5.3 Verifiable (vs. perception)
To test our hypothesis that crowds can substitute for experts more effectively when completing
verifiable, fact-based tasks, we purposively selected four factual V-Dem “A” indicators (i.e., vari-
ables that are not expert-coded in the V–Dem dataset, but rather pertain to objective responses)
based on two criteria. First, we consider the dimensionality of the fact; whether only one con-
cept is employed to search for and code the fact or whether finding the fact implicitly requires
an understanding of several different concepts. For example, suffrage is a unidimensional concept,
whereas the requirements for referendum are complex and multidimensional (e.g., different types
of referenda, different levels, different approvals stages, etc.). Second, we consider how obscure the
fact was: whether crowds (or experts) would know where to look to discover the fact or not. For
example, the legal provisions for suffrage are located in legal documents of the country, whereas
the suffrage level in practice is not always published in an official document. With this in mind,
the variables we chose are as follows.8
• Minimum voting age: Easy to find and unidimensional.
• Bicameral legislature: Less easy to find and unidimensional.
• Referenda permitted: Easy to find and multidimensional.
• Suffrage level: Less easy to find and multidimensional.
7See Appendix F for the full text of this question.
8See Appendix F for the full text of the questions.
12
3.5.4 Recency
The V-Dem project covers most countries from 1900 to 2016. We have selected six five-year periods
ranging from distant years to more recent years. We chose to use five year periods to reduce the
workload on coders, while ensuring a relatively large number of observations per country-year-
variable. Randomly selecting years from the entire period would risk losing coverage, while asking
coders to code the entire time period would not be feasible. In selecting years, we considered three
criteria. First, in line with our recency hypothesis, we deliberately selected some five-year periods
that are recent and some that are far in the past, expecting to find lower substitutability going back
in time. Second, we carefully selected times covering major political events to assess the degree
to which coders static-code (i.e., do not change their codings over time). Finally, we deliberately
chose some five-year periods prior to which the crowd coders are likely to have been born.
• 2011-2015: The most recent time period, and thus the period with which coders are most
likely familiar.
• 2001-2005: A more distant time period in which crowds were nonetheless alive and aware.
• 1992-1996: Third wave of democracy, still in many coders’ lifetimes.
• 1966-1970: Revolutions, coups, protests, far in past.
• 1946-1950: Post-war, far in past.
• 1916-1920: Post-war, very far in past.
3.5.5 Information availability
We quantify information availability at the country level and year level using custom measures
detailed below.
Information availability by country: Our approach in developing a measure of information
availability at the country level was to evaluate the “googleability” of different countries. To do
this, we wrote software to measure the amount of data on each country in the world available
on Wikipedia, as a proxy for this general notion of easily available information. Wikipedia has a
number of standardized pages and hierarchies for organizing pages of a similar nature. In addition,
it has a number of “hidden” (in the sense that they aren’t linked directly from substantive pages,
yet they are still open and available for public viewing) pages that provide meta-directories of such
pages, to an arbitrary depth of hierarchy. Our approach was to select one of these meta-directories
as appropriate to the country level unit of analysis and then recursively count and download the
pages therein for each country.
We downloaded the full text of all pages on Wikipedia, three levels deep in the organizational
tree for “Politics by Country.” It was important to get more than just the top level pages because
those by design are truncated at a certain length and then subdivided. For example, the “Politics
of (Country Name)” pages are almost all of about the same length, even though there is vastly
more information on certain countries. So all countries look the same at the first level in terms of
length. On the other hand, too deep of a recursion into the hierarchy only increases skew. That
is, past three levels, most countries have only a few brief pages, and all the additional data is
simply adding to the countries that already have the highest counts. In addition, we also screen
out pages Wikipedia has labeled “stubs” (i.e., placeholder pages with at most a sentence or two of
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Table 3: Countries
Name Political Polyarchy Information Case English V-Dem
Name Characteristics Index (CI) Availabilty Familiarity Official Data
for Turk-
ers
Language? Released?
United
States
One of the most stable
advanced democracies,
democratic since 1776
0.86 (0.81; 0.89) 10,889 (859 mil-
lion)
High Yes Yes
Russia Revolution, disinte-
gration of the Soviet
Union
0.06 (0.02; 0.08) 2,019 (138 million) Intermediate No Yes
Singapore Authoritarian but low
corruption, repression,
conflict
N/A 638 (53 million) Intermediate Yes No
Benin Recent colonial past;
country changed names
0.46 (0.35; 0.56) 472 (27 million) Low No Yes
Argentina History of both dicta-
torship and democracy
0.81 (0.76; 0.86) 1,143 (71 million) Intermediate No Yes
Senegal Relatively stable and
consolidated democ-
racy
0.74 (0.69; 0.79) 548 (39 million) Low No Yes
descriptive content) so as to ensure measurement of actual usable information. We downloaded the
full contents of 187,319 Wikipedia pages, and aggregated the data into counts of the total numbers
of characters on the pages associated with every country in the world. This provides our measure
of the amount of information generally available about each country.
As MTurk users are typically native English-speakers, we also consider the official language of
the country as a proxy indicator for whether easily-accessed online material will be readable for the
average crowd coder.
Finally, as another—highly V-Dem specific—operationalization of information availability, we
consider whether the V-Dem data have been publicly released, deliberately including one country
in the study for which data have not yet been made available on the V-Dem website.
With this in mind, we selected four countries for the full experiment—United States, Russia,
Singapore, Benin9—and two for the pilot—Argentina (main country) and Senegal (optional).
As it can be seen in Table 3, the selected countries vary in terms of their political characteristics
that might affect information availability, polyarchy index, information availability score, likely case
familiarity, and official languages.
Information availability by year: In order to quantify the variation over time in the amount
of information available, we made use of Google Ngram database, which contains the number of
instances of every word in every book scanned and analyzed by the Google Books project. In
terms of time frame, the project has scanned books back to the 16th century, and so can serve as
a reasonable proxy for the amount of published material available in general, year by year. We
downloaded the summary file for the project, which contains, by publication year, the total number
of scanned volumes, pages, and words. The latter gives us a relative measure of the amount of
information available in a general sense as we move backwards in time.
We also want to measure how much information is available over time about specific countries
over time, as we expect that certain countries will have more available information than others,
9We may swap Benin for Kuwait, another country for which V-Dem data have not been publicly released, depending
on the results of the pilot and whether coders seem to be using the V-Dem data as a resource.
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with variance over different time periods. We also leveraged the Google Ngram database for this
effort. The database tracks n-grams, which are the occurrence of words next to each other. So
“one word” is a 2-gram of the words “one” and “word”. This is essential because about a quarter
of countries in the world have names longer than one word. We wrote software to download the
appropriate data files for the n-grams that capture the names of all the countries in the world, some
500 gigabytes of data. We then searched the appropriate files for occurrences of the full names of
countries. The result of this is a count of the number of times each country is mentioned in any
published text, for every year going back to 1900 (our chosen start year). This serves as a measure
for how much information is generally available about every country on a temporal basis.
3.5.6 Likert Scales vs. Paired Comparisons
NOTE: Given the already complex nature of this project, and the coding burden involved in creating
paired tasks, we are considering separating the likert vs. paired experiment in a separate study. We
plan to discuss further after the pilot and MPSA.
We will randomly assign coders to one of two tasks. The first set of coders will complete tasks
identical to those assigned to V-Dem experts. Specifically, they will code country-years for our
chosen questions on the Likert scales provided by the question response categories. These tasks
require coders to evaluate country-years according to the given scale and then to place cases on an
ordinal scale, forcing them to make fine-grained and comparable judgments across cases.
The second type of task requires coders to rank order pairs of cases on a given question.
Specifically, we will present coders with a question—and sets of Likert-scale response categories,10
since we know that questions often pack a lot of information into their response categories—and
two country-years; we will ask coders to indicate which country-year ranks higher on the given
scale, and will provide the option to say that the two cases are equal. To reduce the complexity of
the task, we will limit each coder to comparisons between two countries, and cases within countries
will be drawn from the same set that we present to Likert raters. While we could use adaptive
algorithms to optimize the presentation of paired comparisons, we will satisfice in order to reduce
implementation complexity. Specifically, using expert-coded V-Dem data, we will calculate the
distribution of pairwise differences in point estimates across cases within each potential country-
year pairing for each indicator. Then, we will split this distribution into quartiles. Next, to ensure
that coders provide disproportionately more ratings for “closer” cases, we will adjust pair sampling
probabilities as follows:
1. If the proportion of pairs in the lowest quartile—the toughest cases to compare—is greater
than 0.5, simply draw pairings at random.
2. If the proportion of pairs in the lowest quartile is less than 0.5, oversample from the lowest
quartile so as to set that proportion at 0.5, proportionally reducing the probability of sampling
from the upper 3 quartiles.
Once we have determined the sample of pairs to present to the coders, the coder will see one
pair at a time, holding the indicator constant within and across the set of pairs that they see. For
example, the coder might be asked: “Considering Argentina in 2012 and Chile in 2014, which had
greater political killings?” The response categories will simply be “Argentina in 2012” and “Chile
in 2014” and “These two cases had the same level of political killings.” Across the sample of coders
10In other words, the full V-Dem question text.
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and the number of observations, this approach will generate a dataset of rankings for an expansive
dataset of country-year pairs.
Once we obtain the crowd-sourced rankings, we will use contest scoring techniques (Schnakenberg
& Penn 2014, Coppedge, Glynn, Lindberg, Pemstein & Seim 2015) to estimate latent scales from
the participant-provided rankings and compare country-year scores on the crowd-sourced scales to
those produced by applying IRT models to expert-produced Likert scores.
We expect that latent scales extracted from the paired comparisons task will better approximate
expert-based estimates than will estimates drawn from crowd-sourced Likert ratings. Fundamen-
tally, we expect crowd-sourced coders to have trouble matching experts in fine-grained, complex,
tasks, like Likert scale placement, requiring consistency in scale application over space and time.
On the other hand, crowd-coders may be able to carry out the comparatively simpler task of rank-
ordering with reasonable accuracy. Moreover, given sufficient crowd-coders of sufficient accuracy, it
is theoretically possible to extract valid measures from error-prone paired comparisons (Honaker,
Berkman, Ojeda & Plutzer 2013). An earlier experiment (Coppedge et al. 2015) leads us to expect
that the paired comparison task may provide the best way to leverage the power of crowds to
replace the sorts of expert judgments that we examine here.
3.6 Operationalizing hypotheses about coder characteristics
3.6.1 Training
To operationalize training, coders will have access to a “training manual” that compiles all of
the clarifications and definitions provided to V-Dem expert coders in an indexed and searchable
document. We will track whether or not coders open this document. We expect to see greater
substitutability across crowds and experts among those crowd coders who open this document.
3.6.2 Case familiarity
Since “expertise” is closely related to experience and familiarity, in the pre- and post-survey ques-
tionnaires, we will document whether the coder coded a country of past or present long-term
residence and whether the coder is fluent in the official language(s) of the country. See sections D
and G for exact question wording.
3.6.3 Baseline knowledge
Similarly, “expertise” is also related to the level of formal and informal exposure to the topic, in the
pre- and post-survey questionnaires, we will document whether the coder follows politics, discusses
politics, is interested in public affairs, or earned an advanced degree in political science. We expect
these variables to be positively correlated with substitutability. See sections D and G for exact
question wording.
3.6.4 Education
Since higher education may provide general expertise and research skills, we will document the edu-
cation level of the coder, expecting to observe that more education leads to greater substitutability
for expert coders. See sections D and G for exact question wording.
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Table 4: Vignettes Selected as Gold Standard Questions
Vignette % Expert Answers within n
Expected Answer Categories
v2psparban 91.2% 194
v2eldonate 86.7% 135
v2pepwrort 84.9% 251
v2juaccnt 83.4% 163
3.6.5 Compliance
We will ask the crowd coders to complete two sets of tasks that are designed to weed out “non-
compliers,” or those who are simply not attentive or competent.
The first kind of compliance questions uses anchoring vignettes written for V-Dem to mea-
sure basic competency. During the administration of the V-Dem surveys, we ask experts to code
hypothetical country vignettes, which are questions about hypothetical cases written in order to
evaluate the coder’s threshold between different answer categories on existing non-hypothetical
questions. As such, each question has several corresponding vignettes, designed to straddle the
threshold between two of the original question’s Likert-scale answer categories. In an ideal sense,
perfectly written vignettes coded by perfectly performing coders should never have any submitted
answers other than the two choices designed to be tested. Therefore, the percentage of answers
submitted other than those two choices for a given vignette can be used as a measure of how well-
performing a particular vignette is. By extension, this makes verifiably well-performing vignettes a
good instrument for measuring coder competence; they require no country-specific or time-specific
knowledge, but do require an ability to understand the political science concepts being examined
in the question. We have therefore selected four of the best performing vignettes to serve as “gold
standard” questions. They are listed in Table 4 below. We will create an additive index of these
gold standard questions (number of vignettes answered correctly) as a covariate in analyses that
captures coder competence.
The second kind of compliance task is a “screener,” a task primarily designed to weed out
fraudulent (automated) coders. It will also serve as a training that all crowd coders will receive.
In this task, a hypothetical country vignette (which we used as anchoring vignettes within V-Dem)
will appear with instructions on how it should be coded. For example, the coder will read a vignette
and then be directed to assign it a four. There are two screener vignette tasks for each of the nine
indicators (representing the extremes of the Likert scale), and one will be randomly selected for the
coder to complete before they complete the 30 years of coding for that indicator.11 See Section F
for the text of these screener questions.
3.6.6 Time investment
We will collect data about the time to complete each task and move on to the next one. While we
cannot directly measure “attention” or “effort,” the time spent on the task is a proxy indicator for
the time investment, which we believe is positively related to the substitutability between crowd-
sourced and expert-coded data.
11Ideally, we would randomly intersperse additional screeners between five-year periods as both a reliability check
and to refocus coders. However, this would likely be onerous for coders and disrupt the flow of coding.
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3.7 Incentives
Coders will be randomly assigned to one of two treatment conditions - low pay ($0.12 per task)
and high pay ($0.24 per task) - with equal probability (0.5). We expect better-paid coders to
outperform lower paid coders. We will strengthen the nature of this treatment by displaying a
“Payment Earned so Far” tracker at the bottom of the screen to the coder throughout the survey.
We also expect higher levels of attrition from the low-payment sample. However, we do not
have any information that would allow us to assign numeric values to the rate of attrition; indeed,
gathering information about this rate is one of the goals of this pilot.
3.8 Data collection and processing
We will field the pilot in late March 2017 and field the full study in mid-April the same year. Data
will be stored and processed on CrowdFlower and Amazon Mechanical Turk servers according to
their confidentiality procedures. We will then transfer data to a secure server at University of
Gothenburg to which only three co-authors working there have access, and randomly assign coders
new IDs to replace their CrowdFlower/Mturk coder IDs. IP addresses will be replaced by country
of location and deleted. All data will be deidentified prior to storage on a SVN server available to
the rest of the team, and prior to analysis. The deidentified dataset will be made publicly available
following publication of an article related to this project. Until that point, data will be collectively
owned by the authors and not circulated further without unanimous consent.
3.9 Ethics
The Regionala Etikpro¨vningsna¨mnden i Go¨teborg (a regional ethics review board to which all
projects at the University of Gothenburg must send their applications) has approved the study.
It has been deemed exempt from human subjects review at UNC and NDSU. See the consent
language in Appendix C.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Independent Variables
We operationalize our research design in terms of the following independent variables. Bold vari-
ables provide information about research questions, while non-bold variables are pure controls.
1. Pay treatment (tpayr ): A coder-level indicator for high pay.
2. Task treatment (ttaskr ): A coder-level indicator for paired task.
3. Question-level covariates (sq):
(a) Question complexity: The natural logarithm of the continuous measure we describe
in section 3.5.1.
(b) Issue complexity: The continuous measure described in section 3.5.1.
(c) Issue polarization: A dummy variable for the freedom from political killings question.
(d) Question type: A dummy variable for verifiable, as opposed to subjective, questions.
4. Country-level covariates (tc):
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(a) Wikipedia words: The natural logarithm of the number of Wikipedia words dedicated
to the country, as we describe in section 3.5.5.
(b) Official English: A dummy indicating whether or not English is the country’s official
language.
(c) V-Dem public: A dummy indicating whether or not V-Dem data are publicly available
for the country.
5. Year-level covariates (uy):
(a) Recency: A categorical variable for the six time-periods described in section 3.5.4.
6. Country-year-level covariates (vcy):
(a) Ngram mentions: The logarithm of the number of times the country was mentioned
in the given year in the Google Ngram database, as we describe in section 3.5.5.
7. Coder-level covariates (wr):
(a) Training: A dummy variable indicating whether or not the coder opened the provided
manual.
(b) Follows politics: A dummy variable for whether or not the coder follows politics.
(c) Discusses politics: An ordinal variable for whether how much the coder discusses
politics.
(d) Interested in public affairs: An ordinal variable for how interested the coder is in
public affairs.
(e) Political science education: A dummy variable representing a coder who focused on
political science at the bachelors level or higher.
(f) Education: A categorical variable representing 1) high school or less education and
2) Graduate-level education (reference is college-level education, either at present or
completed).
(g) Gold standard score: An additive index of vignettes answered correctly, ranging from
zero to four.
(h) Screener: A dummy variable indicating if the coder answered all screener question
correctly.
(i) V–Dem use: An indicator of whether or not coder reports using V–Dem data in coding.12
(j) Female: Indicator for female coders.
(k) Age: Mean-centered natural logarithm of coder age.
8. Coder-case-question13 level covariates xcyqr
(a) Country residence: A dummy for countries where the coder has been a long-term
resident.
(b) Language skill: A dummy indicating whether or not the coder is fluent in the coded
country’s official language(s).
(c) Time spent: A continuous variable representing log-scale time spent on variable.
12We can validate these responses with IP checks.
13Some of these are coder-country, others coder-question.
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4.2 Likert Response Analysis
Here we compare crowd-sourced averages to expert averages, focusing only on crowd coders for
whom ttaskr = 0. The unit of observation is therefore the country-year-question cyq, disaggregated,
by t = tpayr . The response variable, dacyqt, is 1) the absolute difference between the average crowd
response and the average expert response for Likert scale questions (from the V–Dem v7 data set)
and 2) the percentage of crowd coders who correctly code a factual question (for interval-level
factual data, we will treat responses ±1 on a 0-100 scale as being correct).14 Given the difference
in scale, we will conduct separate analyses for factual and Likert-scale questions.
4.2.1 Average Response
We will fit a series of regression models. First, we can fit the basic model
dacyqt = α, (1)
where our null hypothesis is α = 0, or more conservatively that α < c, where c is one tenth of one
standard deviation in expert responses on the given scale, as described above.
Next, we can test for a basic treatment effect, fitting the model
dacyqt = α+ βt (2)
where our null hypothesis is β = 0. We expect a negative relationship between the treatment
indicator and the outcome.
We can then examine observation-level covariates, allowing us to test task effects.15 Specifically,
we can conduct these tests by fitting the models
dacyqt = α+ γzcyq
dacyqt = α+ βt+ γzcyq
(3)
where zcyq = [sq tc uy vcy], and each element of γ tests the effect of a case-level covariate, and our
null hypotheses are that γ = 0. Refer to table 1 for hypothesized effect directions. We will also fit
an interactive model,
dacyqt = α+ βt+ γzcyq + δ(t · zcyq), (4)
where each element of δ captures the interaction between the payment treatment and given task
characteristic. While we do not have a priori expectations about how the treatment might interact
with task-level covariates, we will fit this model for descriptive purposes, and to test the core task
hypothesis using a flexible model. We may fit higher order interactions, or consider interactions
between task characteristics from a purely exploratory perspective.16
The averages used to compute each dacyqt are based on small samples, especially on the ex-
pert side. Therefore, we will use parametric bootstrapping, computing average crowd and expert
responses, based on sample-sized draws, with replacement. Specifically, each country-question-year-
treatment cell is represented by ncrowdcyqt crowd and n
expert
cyqt expert ratings. We will resample 1000
times, randomly drawing a bootstrap sample of size ncrowdcyqt (n
expert
cyqt ), with replacement, from the
set of crowd(expert)-raters who provided a rating for cell cyqt, calculating averages for resampled
14In other words, we calculate country-year-question averages/percentages correct within pay conditions, yielding
two scores per country-year-question.
15Excepting the paired/likert treatment, of course.
16In general, findings from the pilot may guide our design strategy in the final study.
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crowd and expert rating sets, and computing dacyqt for each resampling draw. We will fit each of
the above models using this bootstrapping procedure.
In a second approach, we will bootstrap crowd averages, as described above, but replace re-
sampled draws from expert averages with random draws from the posterior ordinal response distri-
butions produced by the V-Dem measurement model. The measurement model factors in expert
reliability and differential item functioning, and thus represents a harder test for crowd-sourced
data.
4.2.2 Individual Responses
Here our response variable is the absolute difference between the response for coder r on country-
year-item cyq and the average expert response.17 Call this dcyqrt. Adding coder-level covariates,
we will refit equation 3, which becomes
dacyqrt = α+ γzcyq + λwr + ξxcr
dacyqrt = α+ βt+ γzcyq + λwr + ξxcr.
(5)
Interpreting α is fraught at the individual level, since the average absolute difference between crowd
and expert averages (α in section 4.2.1) is not the same as the average absolute differences between
individual crowd sourced estimates and expert averages (α here), so we will treat the α parameters
in these regressions as tangential to our core questions. Nonetheless, β and γ provide alterna-
tive tests of our pay and task characteristic hypothesis, controlling for individual characteristics.
Furthermore, λ and ξ provide information about how individual characteristics of crowd-sourced
raters affect their propensity to generate scores close to expert-based point estimates. Again, table
1 provides hypothesized effect directions.
We will use bootstrapping to account for small expert response samples. The procedure is iden-
tical to that in section 4.2.1 except that we need only resample expert responses when calculating
averages. Again, we will use random draws from the ordinal posteriors produced by the V-Dem
model as an alternative to expert coder averages.
4.2.3 Variation in Response
For Likert response variables We will run the models described in section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 with
an additional dependent variable, namely the difference in standard deviations between experts
and crowds dvcyqt. Specifically, we will subtract crowd standard deviations from expert deviations;
thus negative scores will indicate that crowds are providing more variable responses than experts.
Given this coding, table 1 continues to describe our hypothesized directions for the effects of the
pay treatment and included covariates.
4.2.4 IRT Model Fits
Finally, we will fit ordinal IRT models to the crowd data, just as V-Dem does with expert data.
We will use the same prior specification strategy that V-Dem uses for expert-based data. We
will fit two models, one to the low-pay and one to the high-pay group. Because the crowd and
expert IRT fits will produce non-comparable scales, we will evaluate ranks across models. First, we
will examine rank correlations between crowd and expert-based model estimates, across treatment
conditions. We expect higher rank correlations between crowd and expert-based estimates in the
high pay condition.
17We will list-wise delete cases with missing covariates.
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We will also fit logit models analogous to the linear models described in section 4.2.1. For each
dyad-treatment, we will code the dependent variable as 1 if the ranking produced by the crowd
IRT model matches that produced by the expert IRT model, and zero otherwise. Because question
characteristics vary across pairs, we need to create dyadic versions of tc,uy, and, vcy. Specifically,
we will average continuous variables, convert Official English and V-Dem public into ordinal—
neither, one, both—variables, and treat recency as a series of dummy variables for each period,
where up to two periods might both be set to one for a given pair. We will use method of composition
to account for posterior uncertainty in the measurement model estimates. If computationally
necessary, we will randomly subsample no fewer than 10,000 dyads.
4.3 Paired Responses
We need not conduct separate analyses of the verifiable and subjective questions for these analyses.18
The text below refers to the subjective questions. When considering verifiable questions, we will use
true answers rather than measurement model estimates and we can omit the method of composition
since these scores are not measure with error.
4.3.1 Average Response
Here our observation level is paired country-years, by item. Our dependent variable is the pro-
portion of crowd-sourced responses that match the rank-ordering produced by the measurement
model for the paired country-years. Using GLM to deal with the fact that our response variable
is proportions, we will fit the models described by section 4.2.1. Because question characteristics
vary across pairs, we need to create dyadic versions of tc,uy, and, vcy. Specifically, we will av-
erage continuous variables, convert Official English and V-Dem public into ordinal—neither, one,
both—variables, and treat recency as a series of dummy variables for each period, where up to two
periods might both be set to one for a given pair. We will use method of composition to account
for posterior uncertainty in the measurement model estimates.
4.3.2 Individual Response
Here we replicate section 4.2.2, using logit instead of OLS. The observation level is rater-diad and
the response variable is a dummy indicating whether or not the provided rank ordering matches the
MM ranking. Again, we can use method of composition to account for uncertainty in measurement
model estimates. We now need to adjust coder-country level variables in xcr, transforming Country
residence and Language skill into neither/one/both ordinal variables.
4.3.3 Comparing Model Based Ranks
We start by splitting the paired data by payment treatment. Then, once for each pay group, we
will fit a contest scoring model (Schnakenberg & Penn 2014) to the paired rank data, bootstrapping
the procedure 1000 times to produce estimates of uncertainty. For each question this will produce a
rank ordering of the cases considered by crowd coders. Then, once for each of the 1000 bootstrapped
scoring model fits, we will compare the ordering of pairs produced by crowd coders to the ranks
produced by the V-Dem measurement model, randomly selecting a posterior draw to compare with
the bootstrap draw at each iteration.19 This will produce our dependent variable, ydqt, which is a
18We must treat the binary variables as ordinal; that is more or less bicameral and referenda more or less permitted.
19We may have to sample a subset of pairs to make this tractable. Again, we will subsample no fewer than 10,000
dyads.
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distribution over a dyad-question-treatment level dummy variable, indicating whether or not the
dyad is ranked “correctly,” based on the V-Dem measurement model. Our analysis of these data
will follow the same pattern as section 4.3.1, except the model is a simple logit, and we will use the
method of composition to reflect estimation uncertainty.
4.4 Likert vs Paired
We expect crowds to perform better at paired comparisons than Likert scale responses. To evaluate
this prediction we will compare the rank orderings produced by IRT model fits to crowd-based likert
responses (see section 4.2.4) to those produced when we apply contest scoring models to paried
comparisons (section 4.3.3). Here we will compare rank correlations with expert-based IRT-based
estimates, using the procedure described in section 4.2.4.
4.5 Item Non-Response and Attrition
We will fit count models of item non-response, following the basic structure of sections 4.2.1 and
4.2.2. In other words we can fit those models described in section 4.2.1, but our response variable
will be aggregate (at the country-year-item level for Likert responses and at the dyad-item level for
paired responses) and individual non-response counts. We expect the same relationship between
variables of interest and the outcome variables.
5 Research team
The research team consists of the authors of this pre-analysis plan. All co-authors are Principal
Investigators, Project Managers, and Post-Doctoral Research Fellows of V-Dem.
6 Deliverables
There will be several products from this study. We will present some of the results from the pilot
at MPSA 2017.20 The results of the full study will be presented at V-Dem 2017, EPSA 2017, and
APSA 2017, and will be prepared for journal publication.
7 Budget
For the pilot, we plan to recruit 400 individuals, half of which will be randomly assigned to the
high-pay condition ($0.24) and half of which will be assigned to the low-pay condition ($0.12).
Each participant will complete 66 tasks at this pay rate, with an option to complete an additional
31. All participants, regardless of pay treatment status, will receive $0.10 per answered question on
the pre- and post-survey questionnaires. This results in a budget of $7,840 in participant payments
and a 20% CrowdFlower transaction fee of $1,568, for a total of $9,408.
In the full study, we plan to recruit 3,300 individuals. The pay rates and number of tasks are
otherwise the same, for an anticipated budget in the full study of $63,888 in participant payments
and $12,778 in a 20% transaction fee, for a total of $76,666.
20We will consider whether these results in and of themselves are suitable for publication, either in combination
with the results of the full study or as a stand-alone set of results. However, the primary goal of the pilot is to refine
our approach, not academic publication.
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A Notes for Coder
• Section headers should be displayed to respondents, with the following modifications:
– Pre-Survey Questionnaire: “Pre-Survey Questionnaire”
– Gold Standard Questions: “Hypothetical Questions”
– Main Coding Task: See note at the beginning of Section F.
– Post-Survey Questionnaire: “Post-Survey Questionnaire”
• Paging design: Display one question per page unless specified otherwise, and display the
introduction to each section on its own screen.
• Page-specific or question-specific notes for coding are displayed between brackets [ ]. These
should not be displayed to the respondent.
• Variable names are displayed between parentheses ( ). These should not be displayed to the
respondent.
• Questions are specified after “Question”. “Question” should not be displayed to the
respondent.
• Responses are specified after: “Response” “Response” should not be displayed to the
respondent.
• Codes for responses are specified before “:” next to the responses. These should not be
displayed to the respondent.
• Items are single-punch radio buttons, unless specified otherwise.
• Nonresponse prompting: Unless specified otherwise, for every question that the respondent
fails to respond, please display the following text in a pop-up.
– Text: “There is 1 unanswered question on this page. Would you like to continue?
You will not be paid for questions you do not answer.” Buttons: “Continue Without
Answering” and “Answer the Question”
∗ NOTE: We will not pay for unanswered questions.
• Recording nonresponse prompting: Please record whether the nonresponse pop up is shown.
• Missing data and nonresponse: Please assign a numeric code to all variables as follows:
– 88 - Don’t know: Note that this option should not be displayed to the respondent unless
otherwise stated below.
– 99 - No answer: The question was displayed to the respondent but the respondent clicked
“Next” without answering the question and then clicked “Continue Without Answering”
on the nonresponse pop up.
– 98 - Other/error: Data is missing due to technical problem
– 97 - Breakoff: The questionnaire was terminated before reaching this question
– 96 - Not applicable: Note that this option should be displayed to the respondent for
certain questions, as noted below.
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• Timing: Record all items’ timing
• Time: Record local time when survey was completed.
• Errors: Please display error text as follows:
– “Sorry, there was an unexpected error in processing this question.”
B Recruitment
[FOR DISPLAY IN AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK/E-SERVICE]
[START SCREEN]
[DISPLAY ONLY]
Dear Contributor, We are a group of researchers at the University of Gothenburg and we are
interested in measuring some indicators of democracy across the world. We would like to invite
you to participate in a short survey, which will take 30-60 minutes of your time. If you choose to
participate in the survey, renumeration will be offered up to a maximum of USD 25.42.
Please click this link to begin the survey: [DISPLAY LINK TO SURVEY]
Regards,
Professor Staffan I. Lindberg
xlista@gu.se
C Consent
[IN QUALTRICS]
[START SCREEN]
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this survey. Below is a consent form that
describes the nature of the experiment, what to expect, and what we will do with the data you
provide. Please take the time to read this over before deciding to participate in this study.
University of Gothenburg
Consent to Act as a Research Subject
Democracy Study
1. Will you be compensated for participating in this study?
• Yes. We will ask you questions about politics in different contexts, both real and hy-
pothetical. You will receive [RANDOMIZED PAY RATE] for each question that you
answer. In addition to these questions about politics, we will ask you a few questions
about your background, and you will be paid $0.10 for each of these questions. Finally,
the very last question of the survey will ask you for your feedback, and you will be paid
$0.24 to answer this question. Once you agree to participate and start the survey, you
will have 12 hours to complete it. During this time you can close and open the survey
as many times as you need. If you do not complete the survey within this time frame,
you will not receive any payment.
2. Who is conducting the study, why have you been asked to participate, how were
you selected, and what is the approximate number of participants in the study?
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• A team of researchers based at the University of Gothenburg is conducting a research
study to measure several indicators of politics around the world. You have been asked
to participate in this study because you are a registered user on this survey platform.
There will be approximately 5,000 participants in this study in total.
3. Why is this study being done?
• The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of how to measure elements
of politics around the world.
4. What will happen to you in this study and which procedures are standard of care
and which are experimental?
• If you agree to be in this study, the following will happen to you:
(a) You will be asked to evaluate certain aspects of a country (e.g., elections, parties,
civil society)
(b) You will be asked to answer a few questions about yourself.
(c) You do not have to answer any question you do not wish to answer.
(d) Your participation in this study will take 30-60 minutes.
5. What risks are associated with this study?
• Responses with identifying information will only be shared among collaborators, and
will be stripped of identifying information prior to circulation. Upon publishing the
results of the research, the anonymized dataset will be released publicly on the authors’
websites
• Participation in this study may involve some added risks or discomforts. These include
the following:
(a) There is a risk that the study may induce boredom or fatigue. You may opt out of
the study at any time, which will minimize this risk.
(b) Because this is a research study, there may also be some unknown risks that are
currently unforeseeable.
6. What are the alternatives to participating in this study?
• The alternative to participation in this study is to not participate.
7. What benefits can be reasonably expected?
• There may or may not be any direct benefit to you from participating this study. You
may find that information included in the study is useful to you. You will also be helping
the team of investigators learn more about how to measure democracy across the world
and how political data can be generated. You will receive monetary compensation for
your participation.
8. Can you choose to not participate or withdraw from the study without penalty?
• Participation in this research is entirely voluntary. If you decide that you no longer
wish to continue in this study, there will be no further requirements of you. You may
terminate your participation at any time. Please note that if you do not complete the
survey, you will not be compensated (even for the questions you may have answered at
that point).
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9. Can you be withdrawn from the study without your consent?
• No.
10. Are there any costs associated with participating in this study?
• There will be no cost to you for participating in this study.
11. Who can you contact if you have questions?
• If you have other questions beyond those explained in this information sheet, you may
reach the contact researcher, Professor Staffan I. Lindberg, via email at xlista@gu.se.
1. Consent (consent)
• Question You have read the above information. You are at least 18 years old. By
selecting “I agree to participate,” you consent to participate in the study.
• Response
(a) I agree to participate.
(b) No, I do not wish to participate.
D Pre-Survey Questionnaire
First, we have a few questions about you. Remember that you will be paid $0.10 for each answer
that you provide in this section.
1. Year of birth (v2zzborn)
• Question In what year were you born?
• Response Year [DROP DOWN MENU, STARTING AT 2000 AND GOING BACK-
WARDS IN TIME]
2. Gender (v2zzgender)
• Question What is your gender?
• Response
(a) Male
(b) Female
(c) Other/Prefer not to answer
3. Time in Argentina (ctrArg)
• Question Have you ever lived in Argentina for a period greater than three months?
• Response
(a) No
(b) Yes
4. Time in Senegal (ctrSen)
• Question Have you ever lived in Senegal for a period greater than three months?
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• Response
(a) No
(b) Yes
5. Spanish language (Spanish)
• Question Are you able to read written materials (e.g., newspaper articles) in Spanish?
• Response
(a) No
(b) Yes
6. French language (French)
• Question Are you able to read written materials (e.g., newspaper articles) in French?
• Response
(a) No
(b) Yes
7. Education level (v2zzedlev)
• Question What is the highest level of education you have completed?
• Response
(a) Incomplete primary.or left before eighth grade
(b) Primary completed or completed eighth grade
(c) Incomplete secondary or left in grades 9-12
(d) Secondary or high school completed, or obtained GED
(e) Post-secondary trade/vocational school
(f) University undergraduate degree incomplete
(g) University undergraduate degree completed
(h) Masters degree (MA)
(i) Ph.D
(j) Juris Doctor or other professional degree (medicine, business)
E Gold Standard Questions
[RANDOMIZE THE ORDER OF QUESTIONS IN THIS SECTION]
Now, we will shift to asking you political questions about hypothetical countries. You will be
paid [RANDOMIZED PAY RATE] per answer in this section.
1. Party ban (v2psparban34)
• Description In Country X, a number of parties contested each other for legislative
power every election year. In the latest national election, the only parties banned from
participating were non-democratic parties advocating for overthrowing the multi-party
system. In practice, this meant that only one party was denied political participation.
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• Question Were parties banned in Country X?
• Clarification This does not apply to parties that were barred from competing for failing
to meet registration requirements or support thresholds.
• Response
(a) Yes. All parties except the state-sponsored party (and closely allied parties) were
banned.
(b) Yes. Elections were non-partisan or there were no officially recognized parties.
(c) Yes. Many parties were banned.
(d) Yes. But only a few parties were banned.
(e) No. No parties were officially banned.
2. Disclosure of campaign donations (v2eldonate12)
• Description National elections in Country X were often criticized for lack of trans-
parency. Although several laws guided how electoral parties must disclose information
such as campaign spending, donations and distribution of spending per region, several
NGOs found that these laws were not being followed. When they were followed, it was
only by smaller parties that were not been able to make their way into the mainstream.
The NGO findings were refuted by the government.
• Question Were there disclosure requirements for donations to national election cam-
paigns in Country X?
• Response
(a) No. There were no disclosure requirements.
(b) Not really. There were some, possibly partial, disclosure requirements in place but
they were not observed or enforced most of the time.
(c) Ambiguous. There were disclosure requirements in place, but it is unclear to what
extent they were observed or enforced.
(d) Mostly. The disclosure requirements may not be fully comprehensive (some dona-
tions not covered), but most existing arrangements were observed and enforced.
(e) Yes. There were comprehensive requirements and they were observed and enforced
almost all the time.
3. State ownership of economy (v2clstown23)
• Description In Country X, many industries remained subject to regulation by the na-
tional government. However, in recent years economic hardship forced the regime to
loosen its controls of several small industries. In addition private schools became com-
monplace due to an overall increase in wealth caused by less restrictive government
controls. These schools, although not initially deemed valuable by the country’s leader-
ship, resulted in an influx of academics from surrounding countries, and lead to a higher
level of education. This manifested itself in the establishment and growth of industrial
sectors that the government no longer had direct control over, making them relatively
more meaningful than those controlled by the state.
• Question What was the level at which the state (the government of Country X) owned
or directly controlled important sectors of the economy?
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• Clarification This question gauges the degree to which the state owns and controls
capital (including land) in the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors. It does not
measure the extent of government revenue and expenditure as a share of total output;
indeed, it is quite common for states with expansive fiscal policies to exercise little direct
control (and virtually no ownership) over the economy.
• Response
(a) Virtually all valuable capital belonged to the state or was directly controlled by the
state. Private property may be officially prohibited.
(b) Most valuable capital either belonged to the state or was directly controlled by the
state.
(c) Many sectors of the economy either belonged to the state or were directly controlled
by the state, but others remained relatively free of direct state control.
(d) Some valuable capital either belonged to the state or was directly controlled by the
state, but most remained free of direct state control.
(e) Very little valuable capital belonged to the state or was directly controlled by the
state.
4. Judicial accountability (v2juaccnt01)
• Description In Country X, there were a number of judges who came under scrutiny for
questionable conduct. The country’s executive had the power to punish judges for not
fulfilling their duties adequately, however as the judges were usually appointed by the
executive through personal connections, this was a rare occurrence. Thorough investi-
gations were rarely conducted as any transgressions were usually handled between the
executive and the judiciary..
• Question When judges were found responsible for serious misconduct, how often were
they removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined in Country X?
• Response
(a) Never
(b) Seldom
(c) About half of the time
(d) Usually
(e) Always
F Main Coding Task
[Coders should be randomly assigned two of the nine variables listed in the following nine sub-
sections. The coder will be randomly assigned a variable, and then will be randomly assigned
to see ONE of the two screener questions for that variable, which will appear on its own screen.
Then, upon clicking through to the next screen, the coder will see the question text for the variable
at the top, and then a matrix of 30 years for one country. The coder will code 30 years for that
country for that variable, and then will be randomly assigned to a second variable. After the second
variable’s screener question and 30-year table is complete, the coder should be asked the question
that appears in the 10th and final sub-section of this “Main Coding Task” section. Coders who
answer “Yes” to this question will then code 30 years for the second randomly selected variable
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out of this section but for a different country. Before each screener should appear the following
statement:]
Now, we will ask you questions about [VARIABLE]. First, we will ask you about a hypothetical
country. You will be paid [RANDOMIZED PAY RATE] to answer this question. Please refer to
the link ’Training and Reference Materials’ if you have any questions about terminology.
[Then, the following statement should appear before each matrix of 30 years:]
Now, you will be asked to evaluate six five-year periods for the country [COUNTRY] about
[VARIABLE], gathering information and conducting research as necessary. You will be paid [pay
rate] for each year you evaluate. Please refer to the link ’Training and Reference Materials’ if you
have any questions about terminology.
F.1 Political killings
1. Screener 1
• Description In Country X, political killings were practiced systematically and they
were typically incited and approved by top leaders of government.
• Question Was there freedom from political killings in Country X?
• Clarification Political killings are killings by the state or its agents without due process
of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result
of deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials, or other
agents of the state (including paramilitary groups).
• Response
(a) Not respected by public authorities. Political killings were practiced systematically
and they were typically incited and approved by top leaders of government.
(b) Weakly respected by public authorities. Political killings were practiced frequently
and top leaders of government were not actively working to prevent them.
(c) Somewhat respected by public authorities. Political killings were practiced occasion-
ally but they were typically not incited and approved by top leaders of government.
(d) Mostly respected by public authorities. Political killings were practiced in a few
isolated cases but they were not incited or approved by top leaders of government.
(e) Fully respected by public authorities. Political killings were non-existent.
2. Screener 2
• Description In Country X, political killings were non-existent.
• Question Was there freedom from political killings in Country X?
• Clarification Political killings are killings by the state or its agents without due process
of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result
of deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials, or other
agents of the state (including paramilitary groups).
• Response
(a) Not respected by public authorities. Political killings were practiced systematically
and they were typically incited and approved by top leaders of government.
(b) Weakly respected by public authorities. Political killings were practiced frequently
and top leaders of government were not actively working to prevent them.
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(c) Somewhat respected by public authorities. Political killings were practiced occasion-
ally but they were typically not incited and approved by top leaders of government.
(d) Mostly respected by public authorities. Political killings were practiced in a few
isolated cases but they were not incited or approved by top leaders of government.
(e) Fully respected by public authorities. Political killings were non-existent.
3. Variable
• Question Please code the degree to which there was freedom from political killings in
[COUNTRY] in each of the following years.
• Clarification Political killings are killings by the state or its agents without due process
of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result
of deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials, or other
agents of the state (including paramilitary groups).
• Response
(a) Not respected by public authorities. Political killings were practiced systematically
and they were typically incited and approved by top leaders of government.
(b) Weakly respected by public authorities. Political killings were practiced frequently
and top leaders of government were not actively working to prevent them.
(c) Somewhat respected by public authorities. Political killings were practiced occasion-
ally but they were typically not incited and approved by top leaders of government.
(d) Mostly respected by public authorities. Political killings were practiced in a few
isolated cases but they were not incited or approved by top leaders of government.
(e) Fully respected by public authorities. Political killings were non-existent.
F.2 Harassment of journalists
1. Screener 1
• Description In Country X, no journalists dared to engage in journalistic activities that
would offend powerful actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur.
• Question Were individual journalists harassed—i.e., threatened with libel, arrested, im-
prisoned, beaten, or killed—by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while
engaged in legitimate journalistic activities in Country X?
• Response
(a) No journalists dared to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful
actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur.
(b) Some journalists occasionally offended powerful actors but they were almost always
harassed or worse and eventually were forced to stop.
(c) Some journalists who offended powerful actors are forced to stop but others managed
to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time.
(d) It was rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors, and if
this were to happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and
punished.
(e) Journalists were never harassed by governmental or powerful nongovernmental ac-
tors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities.
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2. Screener 2
• Description In Country X, journalists were never harassed by governmental or powerful
nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities.
• Question Were individual journalists harassed—i.e., threatened with libel, arrested, im-
prisoned, beaten, or killed—by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while
engaged in legitimate journalistic activities in Country X?
• Response
(a) No journalists dared to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful
actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur.
(b) Some journalists occasionally offended powerful actors but they were almost always
harassed or worse and eventually were forced to stop.
(c) Some journalists who offended powerful actors are forced to stop but others managed
to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time.
(d) It was rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors, and if
this were to happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and
punished.
(e) Journalists were never harassed by governmental or powerful nongovernmental ac-
tors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities.
3. Variable
• Question Please code the degree to which individual journalists were harassed - i.e.,
threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed – by governmental or power-
ful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities in [COUN-
TRY] in each of the following years.
• Response
(a) No journalists dared to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful
actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur.
(b) Some journalists occasionally offended powerful actors but they were almost always
harassed or worse and eventually were forced to stop.
(c) Some journalists who offended powerful actors are forced to stop but others managed
to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time.
(d) It was rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors, and if
this were to happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and
punished.
(e) Journalists were never harassed by governmental or powerful nongovernmental ac-
tors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities.
F.3 Freedom from forced labor for men
1. Screener 1
• Description In Country X, male servitude or other kinds of forced labor was widespread
and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.
• Question Were adult men free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor in Country
X?
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• Clarification Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he
desires to leave not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer’s
coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal
civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.
• Response
(a) Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor was widespread and accepted (perhaps
even organized) by the state.
(b) Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor was substantial. Although officially
opposed by the public authorities, the state was unwilling or unable to effectively
contain the practice.
(c) Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but was not widespread and
usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular
areas or among particular social groups.
(d) Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor was infrequent and only found in
the criminal underground. It was actively and sincerely opposed by the public
authorities.
(e) Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor was virtually non-existent.
2. Screener 2
• Description In Country X, male servitude or other kinds of forced labor was virtually
non-existent.
• Question Were adult men free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor in Country
X?
• Clarification Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he
desires to leave not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer’s
coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal
civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.
• Response
(a) Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor was widespread and accepted (perhaps
even organized) by the state.
(b) Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor was substantial. Although officially
opposed by the public authorities, the state was unwilling or unable to effectively
contain the practice.
(c) Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but was not widespread and
usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular
areas or among particular social groups.
(d) Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor was infrequent and only found in
the criminal underground. It was actively and sincerely opposed by the public
authorities.
(e) Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor was virtually non-existent.
3. Variable
• Question Please code the degree to which adult men were free from servitude and other
kinds of forced labor in [COUNTRY] in each of the following years.
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• Clarification Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he
desires to leave not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer’s
coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal
civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.
• Response
(a) Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor was widespread and accepted (perhaps
even organized) by the state.
(b) Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor was substantial. Although officially
opposed by the public authorities, the state was unwilling or unable to effectively
contain the practice.
(c) Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but was not widespread and
usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular
areas or among particular social groups.
(d) Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor was infrequent and only found in
the criminal underground. It was actively and sincerely opposed by the public
authorities.
(e) Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor was virtually non-existent.
F.4 Power distribution by gender
1. Screener 1
• Description In Country X, men had a near-monopoly on political power.
• Question Was political power distributed according to gender in Country X?
• Response
(a) Men had a near-monopoly on political power.
(b) Men had a dominant hold on political power. Women had only marginal influence.
(c) Men had much more political power but women had some areas of influence.
(d) Men had somewhat more political power than women.
(e) Men and women had roughly equal political power.
2. Screener 2
• Description In Country X, men and women had roughly equal political power.
• Question Was political power distributed according to gender in Country X?
• Response
(a) Men had a near-monopoly on political power.
(b) Men had a dominant hold on political power. Women had only marginal influence.
(c) Men had much more political power but women had some areas of influence.
(d) Men had somewhat more political power than women.
(e) Men and women had roughly equal political power.
3. Variable
• Question Please code the degree to which political power was distributed according to
gender in [COUNTRY] in each of the following years.
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• Response
(a) Men had a near-monopoly on political power.
(b) Men had a dominant hold on political power. Women had only marginal influence.
(c) Men had much more political power but women had some areas of influence.
(d) Men had somewhat more political power than women.
(e) Men and women had roughly equal political power.
F.5 High court independence
1. Screener 1
• Description When the high court in the judicial system of Country X was ruling in
cases that are salient to the government, it always made decisions that merely reflect
government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record.
• Question When the high court in the judicial system of Country X was ruling in cases
that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it made decisions that
merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record?
• Clarification We are seeking to identify autonomous judicial decision-making and its
absence. Decisions certainly can reflect government wishes without “merely reflecting”
those wishes, i.e. a court can be autonomous when its decisions support the government’s
position. This is because a court can be fairly persuaded that the government’s position
is meritorious. By “merely reflect the wishes of the government” we mean that the courts
own view of the record, its sincere evaluation of the record, is irrelevant to the outcome.
The court simply adopts the government’s position regardless of its sincere view of the
record.
• Response
(a) Always
(b) Usually
(c) About half of the time
(d) Seldom
(e) Never
2. Screener 2
• Description When the high court in the judicial system of Country X was ruling in
cases that are salient to the government, it never made decisions that merely reflect
government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record.
• Question When the high court in the judicial system of Country X was ruling in cases
that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it made decisions that
merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record?
• Clarification We are seeking to identify autonomous judicial decision-making and its
absence. Decisions certainly can reflect government wishes without “merely reflecting”
those wishes, i.e. a court can be autonomous when its decisions support the government’s
position. This is because a court can be fairly persuaded that the government’s position
is meritorious. By “merely reflect the wishes of the government” we mean that the courts
own view of the record, its sincere evaluation of the record, is irrelevant to the outcome.
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The court simply adopts the government’s position regardless of its sincere view of the
record.
• Response
(a) Always
(b) Usually
(c) About half of the time
(d) Seldom
(e) Never
3. Variable
• Question When the high court in the judicial system of [COUNTRY] was ruling in
cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it made decisions
that merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record
in each of the following years?
• Clarification We are seeking to identify autonomous judicial decision-making and its
absence. Decisions certainly can reflect government wishes without “merely reflecting”
those wishes, i.e. a court can be autonomous when its decisions support the government’s
position. This is because a court can be fairly persuaded that the government’s position
is meritorious. By “merely reflect the wishes of the government” we mean that the courts
own view of the record, its sincere evaluation of the record, is irrelevant to the outcome.
The court simply adopts the government’s position regardless of its sincere view of the
record.
• Response
(a) Always
(b) Usually
(c) About half of the time
(d) Seldom
(e) Never
F.6 Minimum voting age requirements
1. Screener 1
• Description In Country X, individuals 18 or older were allowed to vote in national
elections.
• Question What was the minimum age at which citizens were allowed to vote in national
elections in Country X?
• Response
(a) NA
(b) Scale [CONSTRAIN TO TWO DIGIT INTEGER]
2. Screener 2
• Description In Country X, individuals 60 or older were allowed to vote in national
elections.
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• Question What was the minimum age at which citizens were allowed to vote in national
elections in Country X?
• Response
(a) NA
(b) Scale [CONSTRAIN TO TWO DIGIT INTEGER]
3. Variable
• Question What was the minimum age at which citizens were allowed to vote in national
elections in [COUNTRY] in each of the following years?
• Response
(a) NA
(b) Scale [CONSTRAIN TO TWO DIGIT INTEGER]
F.7 Bicameral legislatures
1. Screener 1
• Description In Country X, the legislature contained 2 chambers.
• Question How many chambers did the legislature of Country X contain?
• Response
(a) 0 chambers (NA)
(b) 1 chamber
(c) 2 or more chambers
2. Screener 2
• Description In Country X, the legislature contained 0 chambers.
• Question How many chambers did the legislature of Country X contain?
• Response
(a) 0 chambers (NA)
(b) 1 chamber
(c) 2 or more chambers
3. Variable
• Question How many chambers did the legislature of [COUNTRY] contain in each of
the following years?
• Response
(a) 0 chambers (NA)
(b) 1 chamber
(c) 2 or more chambers
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F.8 Referendums
1. Screener 1
• Description In Country X, referendums were not allowed.
• Question Was there a legal provision for referendums in Country X?
• Clarification These are measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process,
not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either the rejection of a
recently approved law or a bill discussed in parliament. (They do not include recall
elections.)
• Response
(a) Not allowed
(b) Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto)
(c) Allowed and binding
2. Screener 2
• Description In Country X, referendums were allowed and binding.
• Question Was there a legal provision for referendums in Country X?
• Clarification These are measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process,
not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either the rejection of a
recently approved law or a bill discussed in parliament. (They do not include recall
elections.)
• Response
(a) Not allowed
(b) Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto)
(c) Allowed and binding
3. Variable
• Question Was there a legal provision for referendums in [COUNTRY] in each of the
following years?
• Clarification These are measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process,
not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either the rejection of a
recently approved law or a bill discussed in parliament. (They do not include recall
elections.)
• Response
(a) Not allowed
(b) Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto)
(c) Allowed and binding
F.9 Suffrage rates
1. Screener 1
• Description In Country X, there had never been national elections.
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• Question What percentage (%) of adult citizens (as defined by statute) had the legal
right to vote in national elections in Country X?
• Clarification This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age,
residence, having been convicted for crime, or being legally incompetent. It covers legal
(de jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (de facto). The
adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of independent
countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies. Universal
suffrage is coded as 100%. Universal male suffrage only is coded as 50%. Years before
electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0%. The scores do not reflect whether an
electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, electoral laws, or the
like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly
if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply (such
as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or
“economic independence”), estimates have been calculated by combining information on
the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information (on population size, age
distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc.), secondary
country-specific sources, and—in the case of very poor information—the conditions in
similar countries or colonies. The scores reflect de jure provisions of suffrage extension
in percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects
the extension, the scores reflect this change as of the calendar year the law was enacted.
• Response Scale (0-100)
2. Screener 1
• Description In Country X, all adult citizens (as defined by statute) had the legal right
to vote in national elections.
• Question What percentage (%) of adult citizens (as defined by statute) had the legal
right to vote in national elections in Country X?
• Clarification This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age,
residence, having been convicted for crime, or being legally incompetent. It covers legal
(de jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (de facto). The
adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of independent
countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies. Universal
suffrage is coded as 100%. Universal male suffrage only is coded as 50%. Years before
electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0%. The scores do not reflect whether an
electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, electoral laws, or the
like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly
if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply (such
as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or
“economic independence”), estimates have been calculated by combining information on
the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information (on population size, age
distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc.), secondary
country-specific sources, and—in the case of very poor information—the conditions in
similar countries or colonies. The scores reflect de jure provisions of suffrage extension
in percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects
the extension, the scores reflect this change as of the calendar year the law was enacted.
• Response Scale (0-100)
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3. Variable
• Question What percentage (%) of adult citizens (as defined by statute) had the legal
right to vote in national elections in [COUNTRY] in each of the following years?
• Clarification This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age,
residence, having been convicted for crime, or being legally incompetent. It covers legal
(de jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (de facto). The
adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of independent
countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies. Universal
suffrage is coded as 100%. Universal male suffrage only is coded as 50%. Years before
electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0%. The scores do not reflect whether an
electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, electoral laws, or the
like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly
if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply (such
as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or
“economic independence”), estimates have been calculated by combining information on
the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information (on population size, age
distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc.), secondary
country-specific sources, and—in the case of very poor information—the conditions in
similar countries or colonies. The scores reflect de jure provisions of suffrage extension
in percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects
the extension, the scores reflect this change as of the calendar year the law was enacted.
• Response Scale (0-100)
F.10 Additional country
1. Additional Country
• Question Would you be willing to code another 30-year period for another country?
You will be paid the same rate of [RANDOMIZED PAY RATE] for each year that you
code for this country.
• Response
(a) Yes, I will code another country.
(b) No, I want to end my participation.
G Post-Survey Questionnaire
Thank you for your assistance with this study. We will now conclude with a few more questions
about you and your experiences. You will be paid $0.10 per answer in this section.
1. V-Dem use (v2vd)
• Question Did you refer to data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project
(either from the Project website, v-dem.net, or otherwise) to assist in your coding?
• Response
(a) No
(b) Yes
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2. Coursework on Argentina (crsArg)
• Question Have you taken a college/university course that focused on Argentina?
• Response
(a) No
(b) Yes
3. Coursework on Senegal (crsSen)
• Question Have you taken a college/university course that focused on Senegal?
• Response
(a) No
(b) Yes
4. Polisci major (v2zzpolmaj) [SHOW ONLY IF v2zzedlev IS F OR HIGHER]
• Question Was political science or a related field (e.g., public policy, public affairs) your
major or focus in your post-secondary education at any level (i.e., undergraduate or
graduate)?
• Response
(a) No
(b) Yes
5. Polisci major (v2zzpolmaj) [SHOW ONLY IF v2zzpolmaj IS A]
• Question Did you take one or more political science courses during the course of your
post-secondary education?
• Response
(a) No
(b) Yes
6. Follow politics (v2folpol)
• Question Do you follow international or national politics on a weekly basis (or more
frequently)?
• Response
(a) No
(b) Yes
7. Interest in Public Affairs (pubaffairsinterest)
• Question How interested would you say you are in public affairs?
• Response
(a) Not very interested
(b) Very interested
8. Discuss politics (dpol)
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• Question When you get together with your friends or family, how often do you discuss
political matters?
• Response
(a) Rarely
(b) Frequently
9. Democracy important (v2demi)
• Question Is it important for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?
• Response
(a) No
(b) Yes
10. Vote Past National Election (votpastnat)
• Question Did you vote in the last national election in the country in which you are
eligible to vote?
• Response
(a) No
(b) Yes
(c) Not eligible to vote
11. Country of birth (v2zzbornin)
• Question In which country were you born?
• Response Country (chosen from menu, include “Other” as an option)
12. Country of residence (v2zzreside)
• Question In what country do you live today?
• Clarification If your time is split between several countries, list that country where you
spend the most time or that which constitutes your official residence.
• Response Country (chosen from menu)
• Question Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions.
• Response [TEXT BOX]
Thank you for participating in this study. We will now issue your payment. Please click the
next button to submit your responses and receive your validation code.
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